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Bridging historical and moral consciousness: Promises and challenges

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ABSTRACT: This special issue is the result of the workshop, *Towards an integrated theory of historical and moral consciousness*, supported by Riksbankens Jubileumsfond (The Swedish Foundation for Humanities and Social Sciences) and Suomen kasvatuksen ja koulutuksen historian seura (The Finnish Society for the History of Education) and held at the University of Helsinki, in 2015. History teaching and social studies education are increasingly expected to develop, among other things, students' historical consciousness. This goal is highly relevant for students' ability to deal constructively with controversial issues of history which is an important civic competence in the situation where in many societies' political arguments concerning, for example, citizenship rights, ethnic and cultural diversity, and democracy are only too often fuelled by simplistic narratives of historical change and continuity. However, there is a blank spot in the existing research on historical consciousness in that intersections between historical and moral consciousness remain very much unexplored. This special issue seeks to identify promising theoretical and conceptual points of convergence for future interdisciplinary studies of historical and moral consciousness. Contributors are from the fields of history, educational research, social psychology, and philosophy.

KEYWORDS: historical consciousness, moral consciousness, controversial history, history teaching, moral dilemmas, intersection.

Background: controversial histories, conflicting politics

The selection of papers in this special issue is an outcome of the workshop, 'Towards an integrated theory of historical and moral consciousness', held in Helsinki, in May 2015, and supported by Riksbankens Jubileumsfond (The Swedish Foundation for Humanities and Social Studies) and Suomen kasvatuksen ja koulutuksen historian seura (The Finnish Society for the History of Education). The workshop gathered together fourteen researchers in the fields of history, history didactics, philosophy, social psychology and educational research from Finland, Sweden, Iceland, Canada, Australia, Germany, and the Netherlands, to explore the theoretical and conceptual connections between historical and moral consciousness and to ponder on prospects of empirical research on their intersections. A wide variety of theoretical perspectives and methodological approaches was discussed, and the workshop resulted in plans of further research collaboration. This special issue is an initial outcome of such collaboration.

The idea of arranging an exploratory workshop on this topic originated in the discovery that there is a blank spot in the research on historical consciousness and that this lacuna has relevance for the contemporary political and social concerns. In many societies there are currently intense debates, even violent clashes, around the issues of cultural and ethnic diversity, citizenship, migration, integration, identity and social inequality. Much of this political and social turbulence can be traced back to the economic, demographic and ecological dimensions of globalisation. Traditional lifestyles have been shattered, and those who find themselves on the losing side in the globalisation game, or feel that their previously comfortable position is turning insecure, easily respond to the new situation with fear and anxiety, even aggression. In times of uncertainty, frustration and despair fundamentalism and authoritarianism are welcomed by many who yearn for a return to seemingly clear-cut, closed cultural communities and social categories (see, for example, Castles, 2000; Delanty, Wodak, & Jones (eds), 2008; Guibernau, 2007; Milanovic, 2016). These tendencies have a close relation to past events and therefore plead to be understood in relation to history (Pinar, 2012).

The diversity of historical narratives, interpretations of the social world, and foundations for societal values in many Western societies has grown as a result of increased cultural heterogeneity and the new social movements that since the 1960's challenged previously hegemonic values and norms and demanded for a recognition of 'subaltern voices' (see, for example, Gayatri Spivak's seminal text, *Can the subaltern speak?,* 1988). Canonic interpretations of national histories have become under scrutiny, though in some cases there has been renewed demand for them, too (see, for example, Grever & Stuurman (eds), 2007; Symcox & Wilschut (eds), 2009; Taylor & Guyver, 2011). Increased plurality of historical narratives is a positive development in that it suggests that the diversity of collective memories in society is accepted as legitimate more readily than before. However it follows from this that one also has to be prepared to confront and debate historical narratives that fly at the face of basic principles of democracy, equality and universal human rights.

After the 1980s we have witnessed a moral turn in the study of history in that issues of justice and ethics are recognized as pertinent to historians' work. As George Cotkin (2008, p. 312) has pointed out, "historians are presently treading upon a landscape full of moral topics." Historians are asked to serve as arbiters in not only historical but also legal and, implicitly, moral issues which is not a role they readily find appropriate for themselves (see, for example, Rousso, 2003). Particularly questions of making reparation to victims of historical injustices has been a topic of much public debate and political negotiations to such an extent that the turn of the millennium has been called *The age of apology*, with reference to the numerous demands made to governments and other organisations for reparation for past injustices (Gibney et al. (eds), 2008; Torpey, 2006). Questions of history and moral in/justice are heavily loaded largely, but not only, because the issue at stake is who is included in, or excluded from, the community whose memories of the past are recognised as part of a wider national or global narrative of history. Additionally, seemingly well-intentioned historical apologies may have exclusionary effects (Löfström, 2011). As the 20th century amply shows, narratives of historical trauma have great potential to fuel enmities between countries and within societies, and the last 15 years witness that history continues to be mobilised for a wide variety of political 'uses and abuses' (see, for example, Macmillan, 2010; Taylor & Guyver (eds, 2011).

History teaching for conflict resolution and reconciliation

There are currently numerous educational programs and study materials for History and Social Studies teaching, produced by agencies such as the Council of Europe, Euroclio, The Forum för levande historia, in Sweden, and the rather controversial and not without flaws, Facing

History and Ourselves, in the US. These initiatives are based on the notion that – as Robert Selman and Dennis Barr (2009) put it in the context of Facing History and Ourselves – a study of ethical violations in history may teach students to create "ethical relationships for themselves" in the future. They seek to enhance students' commitment to democratic values and human rights and thus contribute to preventing such violations in the future. In the Council of Europe recommendation on History teaching in 21st century Europe, in 2001, it was declared that, among other things, History teaching should:

> play a vital role in the promotion of fundamental values, such as tolerance, mutual understanding, human rights and democracy [and help develop pupils'] intellectual ability to analyse and interpret information critically and responsibly, through dialogue, through the search for historical evidence and through open debate based on multiperspectivity, especially on controversial and sensitive issues. (Council of Europe, 2001)

In some countries the current curricula mandate that History/Social Studies teaching in school should develop young citizens' competence to assess historical interpretations from multiple perspectives, to judge critically public uses of history, and to use historical understanding for supporting democratic values and human rights. It is, however, another issue how intensively such directions are implemented (see, for example, Stradling, 2011; Ecker, 2013).

There are also numerous academic books that discuss the issues of why, and how to teach controversial history (Baildon et al., 2013; Berg et al., 2003; Foster, 2014; Maitles & Cowan, 2011), but they are not entirely satisfactory as they mostly focus on how to make students adjudicate between conflicting arguments and contradictory evidence, as if in a debate between professional historians. That is a useful civic competence and certainly essential when historical controversies are being negotiated. Historians Without Borders, based in Finland, was launched as an international network in 2016, for the purpose of "further[ing] public discussion about history and to promote the use of historical knowledge for peace-building and conflict-resolution" (2016, n.p.). Left at that, however, the task is reduced to an intellectual weighing of whether historical facts are being 'abused' and how conflicting interpretations and memories can be shared, compared and perhaps reconciled. It leaves out the emotive elements which are of utmost importance in history-related controversies (Long & Brecke, 2003). Moreover, it mostly fails to address the complexity of intertwined narrative threads that connect the past, the present, and the future in people's minds and make intelligible to them who they are, what they want, and what their world is like. This brings us to the relationship between historical and moral consciousness.

Historical consciousness and moral consciousness

Historical consciousness has been one of the most central concepts in the discussions on History education, collective memory and public uses of history in the last 20–25 years. It pertains to the basic human inclination to make meaningful interconnections between the past, the present, and the future. Historical consciousness also has a moral dimension in that narratives of historical change and continuity are at some level also narratives about moral rights and wrongs, interpreted against the background of present-day values and norms (see Rüsen, 2004). It is the moral issues that people often find most engaging when pondering the relationship between the past and the present: the experience of confronting historical dissimilarity in values and norms stimulates historical consciousness as it invites reflection on how, and why, moral judgments may differ in different periods of time (Ammert, 2013a, 2013b). On the other hand, Ann Chinnery (2013) has suggested that nourishing a feeling of *caring for the past* in an ethical sense might encourage us to *live historically,* to construct meaningful (here, moral) connections between the past, the present, and the future in our lives.

There is a large body of theoretical and empirical research on the nature and development of historical consciousness and how to cultivate it in school history teaching. Contributions to this wide field do not always share the same understanding of the content of the concept which, however, need not be regarded as a problem but simply as a reminder of differences in the traditions of History education and history theory, most notably between the German-speaking and the English-speaking world (for different notions of historical consciousness see von Borries, 1995; Lee, 2004; Seixas, 2004; Rüsen, 1989, 2004; Straub (ed.), 2005; and Wilschut, 2012). There is also a large body of research on topics that in the workshop in Helsinki were put under the umbrella term moral consciousness. They include moral consciousness (Kohlberg, 1984), moral judgment (Rest, 1979; Lind, 2008), moral reasoning (Bucciarelli et al., 2008; Myyry, 2003), moral thinking (Thoma et al., 2013), moral sensitivity (Tirri & Nokelainen, 2011), moral motivation (Myyry, 2003), and moral emotions (Malti & Keller, 2010). The term moral consciousness as such has also been used by Jürgen Habermas (1990) in his discussion on Lawrence Kohlberg, and by Hans-Jürgen Pandel (1987) as synonymous to sensitivity regarding temporality of moral values and norms.

Coming back to the rationale of the workshop and the special issue, we find that what is missing in earlier studies of historical and moral consciousness is an attempt to construct theoretical and conceptual bridges between those two fields. As Rüsen (2004) wrote already over a decade ago, the relation between historical and moral consciousness remains next to unexplored and untheorised.

Inspired by the discussions in the workshop, the figure below attempts to visualise in a preliminary fashion the key concepts in the field and how they could be located in relation to each other (Figure 1).

Figure 1: Starting points for a study of historical and moral consciousness

Both historical and moral consciousness have been studied theoretically and empirically. It is important there is an exchange between theoretical and empirical studies which the horizontal arrow inside the circle represents. In topics like these, empirical work may often neither prove nor disprove the validity of theoretical models but it can provide new insights and raise new questions for future theoretical work. Theoretical studies are essential as the foundation for empirical work and they may generate new models and concepts that can be operationalised, tried empirically and modified, or also discarded if proven to be unfruitful. However the major challenge is the vertical arrow, here painted red, the so-called *missing link* between studies of

historical consciousness and moral consciousness. This special issue will not be able to provide a definitive definition or understanding of the intersection between historical consciousness and moral consciousness, but it aims to provide some guidelines and, importantly, inspiration for future work in this field.

Let us now look briefly also at the elements in the figure that make the frame for historical and moral consciousness and need to be taken into account when designing future research. To be clear, the figure is meant to serve as a heuristic device, not as an end product of a concluded research project.

Outlining the context for the study of historical and moral consciousness

Formal education is an arena where historical and moral consciousness are expected to be cultivated along the lines stipulated in the curriculum, but in school as well as elsewhere people also learn – and even more – in informal education. Our historical knowledge and skills of historical reasoning may partly derive from the history class and also our historical consciousness can be nourished with processes that take place in the history class. Yet at least equally important is the role of history culture (Germ. *Geschichtskultur*) or, as Jorma Kalela (2012, p. xii) has put it, "history-in-society", that is consumed in everyday life and that abounds in narratives with historical contents, ranging from family traditions to state propaganda and guided tourism (Zander, 2014; Kalela, 2012). These narratives are material for the ever on-going process of citizens making sense of the trajectory of their temporal self and the society they inhabit.

For the purposes of this paper we suggest that likewise one could speak of moral culture (in contrast with history culture), in reference to the discernable prevalent patterns of how people in a given society respond to moral concerns in ways that are taken as 'moral'. This is not to suggest that in society there is only one form of the moral life but possibly a plurality of them (see Tester, 1997). Moral culture in this sense could be seen as something that partly derives from moral instruction but also from narratives and practices with implicit moral content that abound in everyday encounters, media messages and, for example, the hidden curriculum of school (see, for example, Jackson, Boostrom, & Hansen, 1993). The philosophical aspect of moral consciousness is also important to consider in order to avoid an indoctrination of the kind that pushes bounded moral values, or morality, onto students.

Figure 1 singles out political and societal climate in order to remind us of what Fernand Braudel called history of events, 'history of short duration' (*courte durèe*). These are more short-term phenomena of societal and political life that may be reflected in how, for example, historical and moral issues are framed, verbalised and negotiated in a particular time and space. The effect of this is like noise in radio transmission and needs to be considered when designing empirical research on historical and moral consciousness and analysing data from it.

Finally, there is in the figure the element of temporal change, from the past to the present and the future, which is actually a dimension that goes through all the aforementioned elements. Historical and moral consciousness, education, history culture, moral culture, and political and societal climate exist in a state of flux where for example individual citizens' historical consciousness is not static. This dimension in the figure should not be pictured as a left-right or a bottom-up scale but away from the reader and beyond the surface of the page, or of the immediate, direct attention of teachers and students. It influences people's perspectives and world views and cannot be ignored especially on a topic as sensitive as this interaction between historical consciousness and moral consciousness

The figure is a deliberately slim model in that it intentionally leaves out of the picture, for the time being, questions of the innate capacity of the humans of having empathy, compassion and altruism. In a sense this capacity is one part of a history of very long duration, namely evolutionary development, and as such it could well be taken into account in our crude model with its dimension of temporal change. For the purposes of theorising on intersections of historical and moral consciousness and how their developments may interconnect, work by researchers like Steven Pinker (2011), for example, is extremely relevant.

The present-day concerns and moral dilemmas inform how the past and its moral dilemmas are perceived, and this feeds also to expectations about the future and its moral dilemmas (Ammert, 2013a). Thus, education of historically informed and morally engaged citizens would greatly benefit from understanding how people interrelate the past, the present and the future, how they handle complex moral dilemmas, and, very importantly, how they ponder on implications of historical moral dilemmas for the present and the future. These processes entail mobilising resources of historical and moral consciousness, and the crucial point is how the two resources interact and possibly support or obstruct each other. In educational contexts it is also relevant to ask how historical and moral consciousness could be developed and how their development and levels of sophistication can be assessed or 'measured'. This is a complex issue and a formidable theoretical and methodological challenge. There is, for example, the risk that measuring instruments fail to do justice to the "ambiguities, ambivalences and contradictions inherent in concrete forms of historical [and moral, we add] consciousness," as Carlos Kölbl and Lisa Konrad (2015, p. 26) point out (see also more generally Ercikan & Seixas (eds) 2015, part I).

Experts in History and Social Studies education were well-represented in the workshop in Helsinki, 2015, and the same is true in this special issue. It may be a reflection of the recognition that History/Social Studies educators in particular are expected to cultivate young citizens' and their history teachers' ability to reflect on historical problems and moral dilemmas and that, consequently, many History/Social Studies educators in universities are engaged in doing research on these themes. For example, the editors of this special issue have researched historical consciousness in school textbooks and the place of ethical values in historical thinking and in history teaching (see, for example, Ammert, 2008, 2013a, 2013b), adolescents' perceptions of the meanings and justification of historical reparations as a reflection of their historical consciousness, and the public uses of historical reparations (see, for example, Löfström, 2011, 2014), adolescents' responses to issues of violence and responsibility, the place of social and historical controversies and moral dilemmas in the guidelines mandated by core curricula (see, for example, Edling, 2009, 2012, 2016; Edling & Frelin, 2013), and the question of representing sensitive pasts in the History curriculum (see, for example, Sharp, 2011). One particular theme which has been studied extensively by History educators and which has a close connection with historical and also moral consciousness is historical empathy and how to develop it (see, for example, Brooks, 2009; Davis, Yeager, & Foster (eds), 2001; as an example of a social psychological approach to the concept of empathy see Myyry, Juujärvi, & Pesso, 2010).

The topics that would be very important to address in future research on intersections of historical and moral consciousness are, to put it schematically, what premises and patterns of explanation and justification are visible when people speak of historical moral dilemmas and contemporary controversial social issues and their causes, content, and consequences. This is a complex field of cognitive and emotive dynamics, and when for example students are studied it is difficult to distinguish the skills of 'historical and moral thinking' or historical literacy and moral literacy from generic thinking skills and more generic skills of reading and writing. Moreover, one has to take into account students' historical/social studies content knowledge

which also has a role in how students reason about historical questions, including dilemmas with moral content (see, for example, Radinsky et al., 2015; Reisman, 2015).

The agenda and the contributions of the special issue

This special issue aims to help identify promising points of convergence between studies of historical and moral consciousness. The visualisation in figure 1 is meant to capture our preliminary understanding of the field, and we hope that in the future there will be more sophisticated and empirically substantiated theoretical models of the intersections of historical and moral consciousness and the reciprocal dynamics between the two.

The contributions that follow range from empirical to more theoretical explorations. Their conceptual and terminological solutions vary to an extent as they reflect the variety of disciplinary perspectives among the authors.

In the article *Moral and historical consciousness* Guðmundur Heiðar Frímannsson discusses moral development as part of the moral growth of a person. A crucial question is, what does moral development consist of? Frimanssson ponders the question from an Aristotelian, a Kohlbergian, and an ethics of care perspective. He proceeds to discuss whether historical and moral consciousness are related and how. Frimannsson sets the hypothesis that the link between them may be that one part of understanding historical events is to understand their significance, and significance here comes partly from the moral relevance of the events for us. If this is true, then historical understanding is, in part, understanding the moral importance of the past. Moral and historical consciousness are necessarily linked to each other and cannot exist separately.

The article *Narrative multiplicity and double standards: The complexity of 'historical apologies' and consequences for historical thinking and learning,* by Andreas Körber, starts from the contention that recognizing temporal changes in norms and values when writing history is a standard approach in historiography. Yet recognizing such differences between the past and the present norms and values is only part of the solution to the problem of interrelating a temporal dimension with other, for example normative, dimensions of human orientation. Körber argues that there would need to be a concept of how to integrate normative standards in historical meaning-making in a reflective way. Drawing from Jörn Rüsen, Jacques Lacan and Harald Welzer he elaborates a matrix for addressing the temporal dimension of values in both synthetic and analytical operations of historical thinking.

In her article, *Historical and moral consciousness in the light of ethics of dissensus: One approach to handle plurality in education*, Silvia Edling starts from the observation that today many societies face increased intolerance towards and violence against those considered to be foreigners. Parallel to these trends, many societies are, in a higher degree than before, influenced by simplistic populist rhetoric that is based on a binary logic of black and white and conjoins elements from conservative, nationalist, and neo-liberal discourses. Violence is a multifaceted phenomenon, and Edling brings to attention the consequences of othering as embodied manifestation in everyday life. From this way of reasoning, one aspect of violence is created in the collision between the Other we encounter and the Other that is within ourselves. The article explores the relationship between history/time and ethical responsibility by drawing on the work of Ewa Ziarek, and asks how the descriptions between historical and moral consciousness in education can be grasped so that it does not overlook the presence of the embodied Other?

In their article, 'An explorative dialogue between History education and social psychology: Analyzing adolescents' reasoning about transgenerational responsibility', Jan Löfström and Liisa Myyry discuss what new insights for the study of historical and moral consciousness may

result from analysing shared material from the perspectives of History education and social psychology. The material used in the article comes from a study of what Finnish adolescents' reasoning about historical responsibility and reparations can tell of their historical consciousness. The authors engage in a dialogue on what questions the material raises in a social-psychological study of morality, and what might be the intersections between a study of historical and moral consciousness in this concrete case.

In his article, 'Patterns of reasoning: A tentative model to analyse historical and moral consciousness among 9th grade students', Niklas Ammert propounds that students find ethical and moral issues particularly interesting when interpreting history. History can offer references to contemporary moral judgments, and simultaneously moral values also provide contexts through which students can connect with the past. How interrelations between the past and the present are conceived interacts with students' questions and interpretations concerning moral issues. In the article Ammert reports his study where Swedish 9th grade students discussed an excerpt from Christopher Browning's book, *Ordinary Men: Reserve Police Battalion 101 and the Final Solution in Poland* (1993). The students' answers are analysed in a theoretical model that combines aspects of historical consciousness and moral reasoning. The objective is to look for potential patterns of interrelations and how they are manifested. The conclusions should be seen as a step towards founding a model to how historical consciousness and moral consciousness as theoretical concepts are interrelated.

In Fredrik Alvén's contribution, *Teaching democratic citizens via their historical consciousness: A contradictory mission*, the starting point is, that an expectation of History teaching in Sweden is to educate citizens who endorse the values in the chapter *Fundamental values and tasks of the school*, within the national curriculum. This is to be done by developing students' historical consciousness. Yet that can be managed in different ways which may be in conflict. Alvén analyzes the dilemma in history teaching by comparing the objectives of citizenship education in the national curriculum and the theoretical construction of how to develop students' historical consciousness as it is described in the History syllabus. The article gives a tentative suggestion for how to resolve the dilemma following from tensions in the curriculum.

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Moral and historical consciousness

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ABSTRACT: In this article I attempt to answer the question - is there is a conceptual link between moral and historical consciousness? I shall first discuss moral concepts and moral development; try to explore what they mean, and what they involve. In doing that I hope to get a reasonable answer to what defines moral consciousness. In the second part I will analyse historical consciousness and argue that there is a conceptual link between moral and historical consciousness. My idea is that reconfiguration of historical events is a necessary feature of understanding the importance of historical events; it is sometimes a necessary feature of coming to an understanding of moral actions and seems to be a part of practical judgement as moral wisdom. Reconfiguration seems to be a necessary part of moral deliberation and coming to appreciate the force of the morally normative.

KEYWORDS: moral consciousness, reconfiguration, historical consciousness, significance of historical events.

Morality, moral consciousness

First, something about the words moral and historical consciousness. Is moral consciousness identical to moral knowledge? When talking about moral consciousness are we just talking about morality? Or is moral consciousness something else altogether? This is not some whimsical questioning about abstruse terminology but something that ought to be set clear at the start.

I discuss morality and history and how they are related. But I also talk about historical and moral consciousness in the sense of being aware of and understanding morality and history and how these two kinds of understanding can be related. The concept of historical consciousness has grown out of concepts like historical awareness and historical literacy and should be "a vital human asset for an orientation to life and the world" (Ahonen, 2005).

Consciousness is the having of experience or being aware of something. It has been widely investigated in modern philosophy but there is no consensus on its status. Conscience is another concept closely related to this investigation. Conscience has its root in Christian morality, especially the protestant one. It is the guide that supplies the individual with ability to distinguish between right and wrong from a Christian point of view. In this sense conscience is a theological concept. I argue for a conception of moral consciousness that is secular. I assume that moral consciousness is the emergent ability of individuals that develops in a dialectic between the individual and their context, the social institutions of their society. In the Hegelian tradition there is a close connection between moral, social and historical development. It is a fundamental truth about human beings that they are temporal beings and they are also moral beings. But being temporal is not identical to being historical. In this investigation I inquire into moral and historical consciousness without committing myself to a grand theory. My aim is to put forward an argument for a close link between these two types of consciousness. This can

have important consequences for how we understand history, for example, that normative moral evaluations are a part of historical consciousness, and for ethics, that it is a historical discipline.

It is difficult to define morality and demarcate its boundaries and we should not expect to be able to do that exactly as we can do for some other concepts. Ethical concepts are not exact concepts but allow for grey areas and problematic examples like vague concepts and open-textured concepts do. So it serves no purpose to attempt to define morality. This feature of moral concepts opens up the possibility that there can be a number of ways of describing a particular event or an action. Yet there are some typical examples of moral thought and ethical inquiry.

One typical example of a moral view is to aim to do the right thing. But what does it mean to do the right thing? There are obviously a number of ways of explicating the meaning of this phrase but two will have to do here. The first is this: Doing the right thing is to do what one would be well advised to do in the light of one´s ends and interests. It follows that one´s ends and interests must be moral for the right thing to be moral. Typically, the ends or interests are the virtues or the *summum bonum* or happiness. In that case doing the right thing is moral. But if one´s ends or interests are not moral, either morally neutral or immoral, doing the right thing cannot be moral. In a game of chess, moving the king from E5 to E6 is neither moral nor immoral but can be the right thing depending on whether it helps you to win the game of chess you are playing. Ignoring cries for help from someone in dire need and injured because of a car accident because you are late for the cinema is an instance of an immoral act. Being late for the cinema is not a reason that can weigh heavier than helping someone in dire need and nobody else in sight who would be able to help. Diving into a swimming pool to save someone from drowning could be considered a courageous act and hence a moral one.

The second understanding of doing the right thing is this: Doing the right thing is doing it because one is duty bound to do it (Deigh, 2010). This means that one ought to do the right thing independently of whether it is advantageous or disadvantageous to oneself, irrespective of accepted practice in society or widespread attitudes. Doing the right thing depends on norms that are independent of the society we happen to live in or the context in which we happen to act at any moment in time. I think we can fairly say these norms are probably based on "rational thought or reason" (Deigh, 2010, p. 10). This way of fleshing out the meaning of doing the right thing would not dispute the descriptions of the examples above but would justify the descriptions differently.

Morality is shaped by a special type of normativity. We use many concepts to describe and investigate morality, concepts like good and bad, right and wrong, that are normative and also moral. Ethics attempts to figure out what is this special type of normativity. The two understandings of morality described above might come up with different answers to questions about the nature of this moral normativity.

Moral development is a fact of human life. Practically everyone shares the belief that in developing from a child to an adult most of us become mature human beings. The innocence of childhood is lost and moral responsibility, moral sensitivity and judgement take its place in a normal adult person. Interestingly, this is an assumption shared by both the Aristotelian theory of moral development and the Kohlbergian one.

There are results from empirical research that spell out how capable children are from very early on. It is even stated that they have some of the foundations of morality from the time they are born. It is not just that they are innately hardwired for morality but they are capable of learning very fast from a young age. Morality is about our relations to other people and to ourselves. It was often accepted as a fact in twentieth century research on children that they could not understand the interests of others. But this is not true. "Literally from the time they´re born children are empathic. They identify with other people and recognize that their own

feelings are shared by others. In fact, they literally take on the feelings of others" (Gopnik, 2009, p. 204). Facial expressions reflect emotions. Newly born babies can imitate facial expressions and seem to connect the relevant emotions with them. One year olds understand desires and intentions and they understand the difference between intentional and unintentional actions, meaning that they have a fairly complex notion of the constituents of the human mind (Gopnik, 2009). Empathy enables very young children to be altruistic and one can even find it in fourteen months old babies. "Two-year-olds can imagine what to do to give other people pleasure or to soothe their pain" (Gopnik, 2009, p. 211).

Children are moral beings from their first year in life and they should be treated as such, as moral and rational beings. This obviously does not mean that children are mature human beings, they are not, they have not yet obtained the necessary experience to mature. It takes time to develop, they need time to learn, it is not until they are adolescents or in their twenties that we can say that are fully mature. This does not mean that they will stop developing at that time but they will have arrived at the point in their own development where they are able to decide what to do on their own terms so to speak, they will have discerned what is relevant in their situation to the decision they intend to take, they understand the principles involved, realise how their action might affect those around them and see how their feelings react to the context in which they find themselves. They must also see if their judgement of their situation and their possible action is justified.

It is a fairly long way from feeling empathy for the face you see opposed to yours in your crib to a young human being fully equipped to reflect on and decide morally. In between come many things. We know that experience in early childhood can influence our development in various ways, serious deprivation can warp our development and deeply influence how we turn out as mature adults. Children who suffer violence can become adults who are more likely to resort to violence. Children who have loving parents are more likely to become well rounded mature adults. But the path from youth to maturity is not in any way fully determined by our experience in youth or by our DNA. Environment has enormous effects on how we develop but it seems also to be true that we influence our environment that in turn affects us (Gopnik, 2009).

One of the important things in our lives is the development of character and virtues. Character and virtues are stable dispositions that regulate our behaviour. We usually talk about moral character because developing an immoral character is not a reasonable aim in life. Virtues are stable, desirable dispositions, vices are stable undesirable dispositions. But why are these notions important, what do they offer us in addition to the development we have talked about already?

The most important thing they offer us is a description of how we turn into moral human beings when we grow up. This is not a simple series of events in anyone´s life but something that happens over time, varies from one individual to another, from one time period to another, from one society to another. But in spite of that we can find common factors that tell us that the concepts of moral character and virtue really do manage to capture something in our development. Morality is a social institution reaching into the psychological. A rule like 'never lie' is social in the sense that it is an accepted practice in most, if not all, societies. But for it to be effective it must become a part of the psychological make-up of all individuals in those societies. The challenge in education and child-rearing is not to enforce the social rule but to make the rule a reason for the individuals to behave. Moral development is not completed if the individual behaves according to the social rule because it is a social rule. It is only if she has accepted the rule, wants to follow it, has made it a part of how she wants to live her life. She knows she ought never to lie and she wants never to lie, she wants to be the kind of agent that never lies. When the virtues have become such a part of the agent´s life, her character is formed and she flourishes.

There are various complex issues that must be tackled if I wanted to flesh out a fully developed theory of character, virtue, flourishing and the good life (see, for example, chapter 1 of Kristjánsson, 2015). Virtue must be a stable disposition of character resulting regularly in virtuous actions. But virtues are not algorithms such that if you possess them they result in virtuous actions. We must choose the action in the light of how we evaluate our circumstances, how we see the morally relevant features of the situation. In order to do that we need practical wisdom or practical judgement. This practical wisdom works in tandem with the virtues enabling the agent to choose the right action for the right reason and from the right emotion. Reflection guided by practical wisdom is the key to developing into a fully virtuous agent (Kristjánsson, 2015). The practical wisdom has two features relevant here. The first is that it comes "only with experience of life" and it involves recognising some features of a situation as more important than others (Hursthouse, 2012). I think it is right that experience of life is a key ingredient in developing into a mature agent and it must involve recognising the morally relevant features of every situation we find ourselves in. Experience, though, covers many things.

Theories of moral development

It should surprise no one that ethicists have argued for various takes on moral development. I will only mention two, the Aristotelian one and the Kohlbergian one. Aristotle argued for his theory of moral development in the fourth century BC and Kohlberg in the twentieth century AD. Both of them divided moral development into stages and Kohlberg added that all children and adolescents must go through all the stages in the right succession.

Aristotle starts with stages that are below the ordinary moral starting point of a child. The first stage of moral development is the stage of the many. Children at this level are pre-moral or amoral but adults who are still at this level are likely to have developed characters that are vicious. This stage is characterised by non-reason-informed feelings, pursuing simple pleasures and avoiding pain and having no notion about what is truly pleasant or disgraceful. This means that the voice of reason does not inform their actions and the appropriate method for teaching or encouraging moral development is habituation but this only applies to the children, the adults are not likely to be changed for the better by any means.

There is no reason to describe all the stages but at the sixth and final stage the moral agent becomes fully virtuous in the Aristotelian model. Their desires and appetites are such that they seek only after things which are moral and agree with reason. They seek for those objects that are the mean or close to the mean according to Aristotle´s theory of the mean and they have fully developed their virtue of practical wisdom or *phronesis*. Aristotle thinks that there are three things that can make an agent good: nature, habit and reason. These three things must be in harmony in human moral agents for them to be good and virtuous. A fully virtuous agent is not perfectly virtuous, that only applies to the gods, and they could degenerate into immoralities but overall they must act morally in most circumstances to count as fully virtuous (Kristjánsson, 2007).

In the twentieth century the most famous doctrine of moral development is the one Lawrence Kohlberg formulated. He took his inspiration from the psychologist Jean Piaget who had argued that cognitive development came in stages and he had also put forward his own version of a theory of moral development. Kohlberg believed that children developed from a pre-conventional level where the main determinants of action are the avoidance of pain and punishment, and at this stage children could also handle questions about what was in it for them when they were required to act. At the next level, the conventional one, they could take into account the social norms in their own society and the reigning stereotypes about good boys or

good girls. Authority and social order became reasons they could understand and could influence their decisions to act. At the third level the child reaches the post-conventional level and is able to take into account in their moral reasoning universal principles and considerations based on social contract (Kohlberg, 1981).

Kohlberg believed that relatively few reached the last stage and adults could be manipulated by pain and punishment. The conventional level is typical of adolescents who in their moral reasoning take the conventions of their own society to be the main criteria of right and wrong. At the post-conventional level it is universal principles that are the criteria for right and wrong. Kohlberg´s theory has been influential in research in this area.

Earlier I distinguished between two understandings of ´doing the right thing´. The first was basically desiring the *summum bonum*, the second acting on duty meaning on principles that at least in some instances could be independent of the context we happened to find ourselves in or of our societies. Aristotle is an example of the first type, Kohlberg of the second type. But both of them agree that agents develop in stages, it takes effort and good surroundings to go from one stage to another and it is probably true that only a few or not many reach the highest stage. Both of them agree that we need to master the moral vocabulary in order to develop and it includes both concepts such as ´good´, ´right´, ´morally good´, ´better´ and ´morally better´. Both of them argue that moral development consists in fostering character and virtues and there is an ultimate stage of moral development. The mix and the emphases are not the same but the ingredients are. They even agree that one of the most important ingredients in moral development is our relation to our own societies but they would disagree on the role and function of it. Both of them seem to assume limited moral abilities in children and are in conflict with the latest knowledge of moral abilities in young children. I have not been describing these two views to take sides on which of them is right but only to draw out what is moral consciousness.

History and historical consciousness

History, as Henry Ford famously put it, *is one damn thing after another*. All events take place at some time and place. All things have history in this sense. We can inquire into the history of the universe or evolutionary history by establishing what took place and at what time. But in this context we are interested in history in a narrower sense, human history. Human history can be construed in various ways, it can be the history of individual human beings, it can be local history, it can be history of human societies, history of nations. It seems to me practically impossible to tell the history of individuals without taking into account their interactions with other people, their families and their communities. The reason is very simple, human beings live in communities as a general rule. This should not be taken to exclude the possibility of solitary lives of individuals but such lives will always be the exceptions. History as an academic discipline takes that into account in the sense that the dominant way of understanding history is the examination of communities or of individuals in communities. History, just like morality, is a world of communities and individuals.

How should we construe historical consciousness? One way of doing it would be to analyse it as an awareness of historical events, something that took place in the past in a community or an individual´s life. History cannot be in the future and it is problematic to think that those things taking place in the present are history. They only become history when they are in the past. This truth about history has the consequence that we always view history from the present and the present influences our view of the past and our evaluation of the past.

I mentioned earlier that historical consciousness is considered "a vital human asset for an orientation to life and the world" and that it had developed from historical awareness and

historical literacy. This indicates that there might be some complex notions packed in the concept of historical consciousness as it has been discussed by historians and theoreticians of history. Jörn Rüsen is the originator of the concept of historical consciousness using it as a way of describing the role of history in education and how it informs our orientation and helps us make sense of the world around us. He argued for a theory of how historical consciousness developed in the individual from recognising the continuity of traditions to using examples from history and ultimately to a genetic type of historical consciousness (Rüsen, 2004). This way of examining historical consciousness is very broad and the idea that historical consciousness orients us in life seems closely connected to how we make sense of life in Rüsen´s writings (Rüsen, 2007). It should come as no surprise that morality is considered closely related to historical consciousness on this view and Rüsen (2004) has argued for moral consciousness being closely related to or even a part of historical consciousness, morality is one way of orienting oneself in life. I find it interesting that Rüsen proposes a developmental hierarchy in historical consciousness in a similar way to Aristotle´s and Kohlberg´s proposal for moral consciousness.

I do not start from premises that lead directly to historical and moral consciousness being necessarily linked but attempt to keep them distinct. So my argument is different from Rüsen´s even though it leads to similar conclusions. My argument here should be considered as an addition to Rüsen´s explications.

No historian has direct knowledge of the past except for those past events they have witnessed in their own time but historians get access to times past through the written words of those who lived in earlier times and recount them based on their own experience or someone else´s. This can be a laborious process and there are various issues that must be addressed before you come to a reasonable evaluation and interpretation of the documents you have been examining. But if this is true about history then hindsight is the lot of those who try to understand the past with the pitfalls that may cause (Kvernbekk, 2013). Historical consciousness is not identical with the latest in historical research but it shares the same premises: It is an awareness of a course of events coming one after another in a human community, it is directed towards the past, the historian has no direct knowledge of the events, and her view possibly skewed by hindsight.

One of the things that historical consciousness encompasses is awareness of the significance of historical events. But knowing the significance of an event means knowing its importance. How do we know or become aware of the historical importance of events in the past and what does it mean? There does not seem to be any simple answers to this question.

Descriptions of actions can vary and they depend on what you want to describe. One can describe an action as pulling the trigger of a gun. The same action can be described as a killing of a person but then it includes also what happened after the trigger was pulled, the bullet racing from the gun to the person aimed at, entering the body of that person and damaging the heart or another vital organ fatally. Killing someone in this context includes pulling the trigger. There is a direct causal link between pulling the trigger and the person dying. Let us look at another example. Ann Dunham gave birth to a son on August 4 1961. We may not find this a significant event. But we can describe this same event differently. The 44th president of the United States was born August 4 1961 in Hawaii and his mother is Ann Dunham. Both these descriptions are true of this same event but the latter one expresses a different significance to the former one. This is one way of figuring out the meaning and significance of historical events, to view them in the light of what took place later. The latter description does not imply that the past was different, only that we can truly describe it differently. I do not think we should believe that the birth was the cause of Barack Obama becoming the president of the United States but it was certainly a necessary condition for it.

This fact that we understand the meaning and the significance of historical events in terms of what took place later has a wider application to our own consciousness. It indicates that when trying to understand our own actions we may think we know what we are doing when we perform the action but later we come to understand what we were really doing. Sometimes this can be a painful experience if what we really did was shameful, it harmed or denigrated somebody we love. Hindsight allows us to reconfigure our own actions or historical events and hindsight brings temporal distance to our thinking about our own life and enables us to view ourselves more objectively (Kvernbekk, 2013). Hindsight seems to be necessary for understanding what we really do because the present can blind us and prevent our seeing our actions for what they are. It also enables a balanced understanding of ourselves, even an objective one, and balanced understanding is a necessary feature of the moral point of view, taking into account the interests of others as children can do from early on. This seems to imply that the same processes are at work when understanding history and understanding morality, in historical and moral consciousness. The implication of this is that morality is part of understanding the significance of historical events or historical development.

There is another close connection between morality and history. The role of hindsight described above was based on the premise that morality was a human institution and we as human beings had the obligation to think carefully about our actions, not in the expectation that we might discover the will of God, the inevitable rise of the proletariat or the free market but in the expectation that we might be able to understand our actions better.

Jonathan Glover believes that morality needs to be humanized because there is no external moral law, stating:

> Morality interpreted in this way becomes tentative, exploratory and partly empirical. It is exploratory on the model of Socrates. Our deepest values are not just obvious. They are not all on the surface. Questioning and argument are needed to discover some of them. But ethics is also exploratory in a different, more empirical, way. It includes seeing the consequences of living by a code of values. A human disaster shows the need to think again about the values (1999, p. 406).

Jonathan Glover is thinking about the moral disasters of the twentieth century, the two world wars, the genocide of the Jews and the class enemies in the Soviet state and China, the genocide in Rwanda. His idea is that we need to look carefully at these events and try to figure out what went wrong, these disasters are a strong indication that something was wrong with our values. This argument of his can be considered in the light of what has been said here about hindsight. We saw how reconfiguration works with hindsight and can change our evaluation of the meaning of an event. I suggest also that this reconfiguration works through the practical wisdom described earlier. Practical wisdom works through experience and recognising some features of a situation as more important than others. Reconfiguring events serves the practical wisdom by drawing out features of events that were not apparent at the time or did not become apparent or relevant until later. Sometimes it is even impossible to see these features of events in the present.

When understanding the meaning of history we use a moral yardstick. It seems to me right to describe the events Glover describes as moral disasters and we should earnestly try to learn from them. This happens through practical wisdom and hindsight. "Seeing the consequences of living by a code of values" happens through using hindsight and practical wisdom. We can reconfigure the code in the light of what later happened and come to appreciate the moral characteristics and the moral consequences of those disasters. If morality was not a part of understanding history then it would be meaningless to call the world wars moral disasters but this is not the case. Moral and historical consciousness are interwoven into each other.

There might be other ways that historical and moral consciousness were connected. One suggestion can be the idea of moral progress (Shiffrin, 2014). Moral development is moral progress. One possible reason for historical consciousness to view an historical course of events

as progress could be the moral progress that is a normal part of life for a human being. This is an optimistic view of historical development and a legacy of the Enlightenment of the eighteenth century. It must be said that this is not a widely accepted view but I think we should not forget that the twentieth century is a history of progress in many areas such as science and technology and in some social and political matters as well. The invention and development of the welfare state could be considered as moral progress in politics. The German Chancellor Bismarck established the German welfare state in 1880s and he did it to prevent social unrest. It developed in the twentieth century into the most important factor of citizens´ good life in Europe and other parts of the world. With hindsight we can see the providence in these decisions for the lives of ordinary people in the states that adopted those measures even though it was rather the interests of the state that originally justified them. If it is true that the development of the welfare state is a major moral progress for ordinary people then it should play a prominent role in evaluating and understanding the twentieth century. The reason is that understanding the significance of historical events or historical development necessarily involves moral evaluation.

Last words

Morality is one of the most important institutions of human life. Every person undergoes development from youth to maturity that is moral. It seems that this development is in stages. Moral consciousness is awareness of the moral facts of human life and it seems that it interweaves with historical consciousness through hindsight. Hindsight enables us to achieve balance, even objectivity, in our moral views. It helps practical wisdom to understand and appreciate events in our own lives and history and interpret the meaning or significance of historical events or course of events. Thus, moral consciousness and historical consciousness are necessarily linked.

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Patterns of reasoning: A tentative model to analyse historical and moral consciousness among 9th grade students

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ABSTRACT: Students find ethical and moral issues central and interesting when they interpret history. History can offer explanations and references to moral values that are still valid − or not valid − in our time. At the same time moral values provide conceivable contexts that connect students to the past. Views on interrelations between the past and the present seem to interact with the students' moral foundations, questions, interpretations, understanding or repudiation. On a societal level similar phenomena can be identified when groups of people turn to history either to handle challenges or to apologize or heal wrongs from the past. Furthermore National curricula prescribe ethical dimensions in school education, not least for the subject of history.

In this pilot study swedish 9th grade students discuss a text from Christopher Brownings' book *Ordinary Men*. The students' answers are analysed in a theroetical model including different aspects of historical consciousness and different apsects of moral reasoning. The aim is to study if there are patterns of interrelations and, if so, how these patterns are manifested.

KEYWORDS: historical consciousness, moral consciousness, interrelations, Sweden, secondary school.

Introduction

Popular representations of history such as books, TV-documentaries and films are mainly focused on situations where fundamental human values are violated and when morally reprehensible actions are committed. There is a demand for stories about war, oppression and hardships, and the fascination of the past appears to be especially strong when it comes to issues of values, ethics and morals. This is visible also in educational contexts. In many countries history teaching and civic education are expected to develop students' capacity to deal with representations and understandings of genocide, a dark past and controversial history.

Previous studies indicate that issues related to moral issues and values issues in historical contexts arouse interest (Berggren & Johansson, 2006, p. 37-38; Angvik et al, 1997, p. 127-129). A likely explanation is that moral issues touch deep down, fundamental human perceptions of good − bad, right − wrong, etc. Moral issues connect the current time with situations in the past, and recognition or repudiation is a bridge over time. Besides, the dream about − and the struggle for − specific ideals such as freedom, justice and democracy, have been the de facto driving forces for historical change and development. At the same time, knowledge about history and the fact that we are all interwoven in time are important preconditions for how we perceive and interpret moral issues. There is a mutual relationship between how we perceive moral values and how we use and interpret history, the historical consciousness (Ammert, 2013, p. 5-15). But there is no answer to the question about what the relationships look like, either theoretically or empirically. How are the historical and the

moral consciousness interrelated? What affects the interrelations? In what contexts? Can historical consciousness and moral consciousness be traced when people reason about historical contexts and events?

There is a lack of research in the field of historical consciousness and moral consciousness. A few historians have approached the issue, but there is more to be done. The concept of consciousness is basically related to psychology, but psychologists have not entered the field (Kölbl, 2009, p. 81). Likely scholars from a set of disciplines can contribute with analytical tools to study and outline an integrated theory on historical consciousness and moral consciousness. In this article I discuss how historical consciousness and moral consciousness could be traced when students reason about a historical text with deep moral or value-based implications.

Historical consciousness

The concept of historical consciousness is central in a continental European history didactics research tradition, and it has inspired national history curricula in several countries. Scholars have formulated rather open definitions and descriptions. This variety has in several aspects been creative, because the concept is a heuristic and inspirational, as well as an analytical, tool. It is useful for developing theories and models for how people encounter, interpret and use history. It is not just a closed and demarcated concept.

The fundamental idea of the concept states that all human beings live in the continuous passing of time, because we have no choice. History is, however, not just a stream; it is more or less palpable connections between the past, the present and perspectives on the future. The past and the future are present in what we call "now". Consequently, the present is interdependent on our relations to the past and to perspectives on the future. The concept was established by the German historian and didactician Karl Ernst Jeissmann (1979, p. 42), who described the concept as the experience of interrelations between interpretations of the past, the understanding of the present and perspectives on the future.

A useful and perhaps more practical interpretation of the concept is the one formulated by Reinhart Koselleck: "The non-simultaneous simultaneousness," meaning that the past and the future appear or "become" simultaneous in the present. Koselleck argues that the historical consciousness of modern time is a tool which makes it possible to view the past in the light of the present and the present in the light of the past. Even more concrete, the definition points to that when the past or the future is represented as simultaneous and present, it is possible to understand and interpret different historical contexts. Thoughts about the future are based on experiences from the past and the present. Our present thoughts/actions are made in the light of the past and focused on the future. It is a never-ending interpreting and re-interpreting process. However, the interrelations must be energized with something or driven by something. My assumption is that moral values and perceptions of moral issues are important as a driving force.

There are additional assumptions involved in moral values constituting an important bridge of the time-transcending meaning-context. Bernard Eric Jensen states it is important that history instruction also relates to everyday issues about life outside classroom history teaching, because these deal with what is near and current for students (Jensen, 1990, p. 158-169). Moral value issues are always current and are probably experienced as meaningful by students and should therefore be able to stimulate thinking over time, and through time. Jörn Rüsen emphasizes the importance of values when he writes that "social values vitalize historical consciousness and give the representation of the past the cultural power of orienting

present-day human life towards the future" (Rüsen, 2000, p. 61; see also Selman & Barr, 2010, p. 19-41).

In order to identify and to refine aspects of historical consciousness, we can use Ann Chinnery's definition of three strands of interpretation or expressions of the concept (Chinnery, 2013). The first is an *existential* strand. We consider and reflect on ourselves and our lives, grounded in the past and the future. There are ethical and moral preconditions for our perceptions and our interpretations of the past, the present and the future. The second strand is a *cognitive* demand, advocated by Peter Seixas. Knowledge about the past will open for a factual interpreting and understanding of – for example – moral problems in the past as well as in the present and the future. A *narrative competence* or ability is the third strand, inspired by Jörn Rüsen and Jürgen Straub. The competence is the ability to receive, interpret and transform narratives from the past into meaningful contexts. All three strands – the existential, the cognitive and the narrative competence – are relevant for encounters with moral perspectives.

Moral consciousness

Psychologists and neuropsychologists describe and define the concept of Consciousness as being aware of something external or something within oneself. They also use the words sentience and subjectivity (Farthing, 1992; Schneider & Velmans, 2008). Obviously when we are aware of our moral perceptions, we have, by definition, a moral consciousness. Our perceptions of what is right or wrong, how we and other people should act and what values we protect, defend and preserve, are decisive for our interpretations of societal contexts and of how people act.

Perceptions, as well as use, of morals have long since been important for a society. If we describe morals as deeply anchored unwritten rules for humans of how to behave, it represents the foundation for the relations between people as well as a "quiet" contract for a civilized and sustainable society. The individuals accept this foundation. There are societies built on repression and force, but acceptance and participation are important values in human relations and for a decent life.

During the enlightenment there was a change from a formalist to consequentialist perspective. Thoughts and reasoning, also abstract thoughts, gained influence over myths, traditions and – eventually – laws. This was manifested by the revolutions in France and in America. At about the same time philosophers formulated ideas that the present is not the same as the past, and the future does not have to be the same as the present (Koselleck, 1975; Carr, 1991). This early stage of historical consciousness coincided with the changed forms of moral consciousness. An openness to opposing ideas, to alternative scenarios and a competence to read scenarios are congruous in the development of the two concepts. There appears to be a circular thinking process in which historical consciousness and moral consciousness presuppose and influence each other. But, we are still in search of hubs, intersections where these two phenomena have their meeting points.

A decisive question is to discover expressions for moral consciousness, and then we must know what to look for. How does it develop? Is it innate or is it shaped in societal contexts? Children's early assimilation into a society means that there is a moral education, though not always spoken aloud, but effective. In previous research Kohlberg has presented a typology for stages in moral development. It says that moral and ethical perceptions and judgments are changed or developed in pace with the development of children and adolescents. Kohlberg's individual moral developmental stages, inspired by Piaget, are based on a gradual moral development, in which moral considerations are preconditions for the behaviour (Kohlberg,

1998). Later Kohlberg observed that the moral development appeared to be higher for youths on a kibbutz than among youths who did not live in a similar close community. This changed Kohlberg's conclusions of societal influence, and he discussed the importance of human relations in moral development. This is a significant correction. Stages might be of interest, but when it comes to historical consciousness and moral consciousness, this view will be too narrow. The importance of contextual and societal influence, for example, in teaching at school or in the family, is of central importance.

Moral perceptions are revised and elaborated in cultural contexts, in relations to other people and when we feel we are a part of a context (Haidt & Joseph, 2007). I argue that there is also a temporal dimension. Accordingly, it is even more interesting when Bruner argues that historical narratives which people can relate to (lifelikeness) stimulate and affect inner deliberations on moral issues. Narratives that put the individual in a context that relates to the past, supply a basis for identification, analysing and taking a stand (Bruner, 2005; White, 1978). Examples are narratives such as The American Dream, the Swedish welfare state "Folkhemmet", but also the opposite – oppression or violations of moral values.

A consciousness is a mental process that is not possible to study directly, but we can identify how people express their perceptions while they reason about historical and moral issues. When individuals and groups discuss, reason or argue, they express their opinions and we can identify what people think. The reasoning can be empirically clarified. From these results we might, in future empirical studies, theoretically deduce moral reasoning to expressions of moral consciousness. The focus of this study is how the individual relates to history and how this relation might correlate to different kinds of moral reasoning and moral consciousness.

In order to identify people's moral reasoning, we must stage situations where they have issues or questions to discuss. There are several studies on moral reasoning. An important study was performed by Paxton, Ungar & Green, who have studied how individuals change their initial perceptions when influenced by counter-arguments and reflecting over them. The arguments have a persuasive power, and the results show that arguments and reasoning are effective. Reflection seems to be a core point, because reflection appears to increase the effect of arguments: "There was no effect of argument strength when reflection was not encouraged" (Paxton, Ungar, & Greene, 2011, p. 9).

Points of convergence: A tentative approach

The introductory discussions on historical consciousness and moral consciousness revolve around and return to three main phenomena, the concepts of *meaning, reflection* and *context*. I argue (tentatively) that these concepts are points of convergence when we discuss relationships between historical consciousness and moral consciousness.

Meaning: Meaning is the prime, the "umbrella"-concept. The concept of meaning represents when something gives a sense of relevance, significance and connection as a foundation for interpretation. When the individual constructs her interpretation, accordingly she understands and explains her view of phenomena as reality. In an analysis of how participants in a historic time travel perceived the messages and how they experienced meaning, we identified situations when moral value perceptions are challenged, as crucial for meaning-making (Ammert & Gustafsson, 2016 forthcoming). Moral reasoning and moral reflection are energized by a sense of meaning, which is recognized also in other studies.

Reflection: The self and everyday life-issues are central as one node for a historical consciousness. This means to ask what does it mean, *is it about me?* and to mirror oneself in another time, another society and in other moral values. The interconnections with moral

issues – even in the past – enable reflecting over arguments and counter-arguments. Paxton, Ungar & Green demonstrated that reflection increases the effect of reasoning and arguments. These arguments might exist in the present time as well as in the past (or in perspectives on the future). The concept of reflection collects the existential strand of historical consciousness as well as the written and unwritten rules that frame a moral consciousness.

Context: To experience contexts is a necessary foundation for meaning. Historical consciousness, the experience of interrelations over time, is a central element, and moral consciousness seems to be a second element. Nel Noddings elaborates the idea that human beings need relationships with other people. The relationships may differ, but they are a foundation of our understanding of ourselves (Noddings, 1984). In the present, this is unproblematic. We are all a part of different contexts. Individuals or groups we feel related to might, however, exist also in another time, and they are manifested by our historical consciousness. "The other" might be a "past other", but present in our minds. In spite of the impossibilities of face-to-face encounters, certain aspects may bridge time. The possibility to interpret and understand relations and contexts is enriched by moral value issues (Bauhn, 2006; Ammert, 2013). By relating the treatment of people in the past, to how one views the treatment of people today, sets up a link through time, a link that can increase students' understanding. The link does not only build upon contrasting and rejecting; getting insight into the contemporary perception of values in the past also means a way "to read" the historical context. By following how the perception of values has changed over time, one gains an insight into the mentality and view of people; the period-bound references provide such an insight that could lead to the opportunity for teenagers to understand history "on its own terms," which otherwise is hardly possible. When deep human issues about right and wrong are discussed, the opportunities increase for the students to relate the content to something understandable and thereby to develop meaningful knowledge. Roger Simon's message is that historical consciousness means to live in a particular kind of ethical relation with the past (Simon, 2005).

A pilot study

The preceding theoretical discussion will be applied to empirical material in order to try out whether — and how — the tentative points of convergence are visible when 15-year-old students respond to a set of questions regarding a violation of human values, the killing of Jewish people. By describing and analysing how the students express historical consciousness (in terms of existential, knowledge-based and narrative competence aspects) and moral consciousness (in terms of how they identify, reflect and take a stand), I will discuss whether the interrelations seem to exist. What connects historical consciousness and moral consciousness? In other words, how are the expressions of interrelations over time related to how students express moral reasoning? Do the concepts of meaning, reflection and context serve as collecting nodes between historical consciousness and moral consciousness and if so, how?

The empirical study in this paper is based on a questionnaire with 63 students from three cities in southern Sweden (Ammert, 2015, p. 21-22). The students in grade 9, aged 15-16 years old, were informed about the study, about total anonymity and confidentiality.[1] The students had the opportunity to decline participation, and they could discontinue at any time. For this pilot study, I have selected those who gave more detailed answers, because there must be text to analyse. I randomly chose two students, and thereby their answers are not representative; however, at this stage the aim is to test the analytical concepts.

The students read a passage from Christopher Browning's *Ordinary Men,* where the Reserve Police Battalion 101 is to evacuate the Polish village of Józefów and send able-bodied Jewish people to Lublin. Women, children and people not fit for work are to be taken into the woods and executed by the execution patrols. However, the commander, Major Trapp, gives the soldiers the opportunity to avoid participating in the killing. Only a few accept the offer. After the text, I ask questions that address how the students interpret the text and what questions they would like to ask of it.

The passage and the questionnaire were quite provocatively designed. Using the profoundly disturbing events in the book, I sought to identify how students react and ask questions to a text with a specific context that is highly morally charged. The power of the story was a way to engage the students.

The concepts – as points of convergence – are expected to function as nodes, to sort the students' reasoning on the excerpt from *Ordinary Men.* In order to describe the historical consciousness of the students, I use Chinnery's model with the three strands.

In the questionnaire the students responded to the following specific questions:

- How do you perceive the story? What does it say to you?
- Is the text relevant (does it make sense) to you? Why/why not?
- What questions do you want to ask the text when you have read it?
- Do you think Major Trapp was right or wrong when he gave the soldiers the offer to step aside and not participate in the murders? Why/why not?

These questions open up for the students to reason about how they describe or define the moral aspects of the content. The questions are formulated to show that the purpose is not to assess the students' factual knowledge, because that would bind or impede them. Instead their own perceptions and interpretations are the focus.

When it comes to historical consciousness, I also added questions in order to enable the students to reason about history and what history is to them. There are two rather clear questions linking moral aspects to historical aspects. It is not possible to ask about connections between the two, but in this way the setting makes the students take a stand and argue for it.

- What is history for you? Explain!
- <u>Can</u> history and/or history teaching explain what is right – wrong, freedom – oppression? How? Or, why not?
- Should history and/or history teaching be about right-wrong, good-evil, democracy or dictatorship? Why/why not?

Student 1 I:5

- How do you perceive the story? What does it say to you?

    I can understand how the author, the narrator, sees this and how he feels about it. The Jewish people were without meaning for the Germans. The more powerful Jewish men had to work while the weak, women, elderly people and children were shot dead. They used Jewish men and promised them to live, but that did not happen in most cases.

- Is the text relevant (does it make sense) to you? Why/why not?

The text really makes sense for me because I know and understand how it feels to be in a war and the enemy tries to take over the country where you were born. The feeling about what Hitler did to the Jewish and the other "unusual", not-German people, is not possible to describe. My heart aches when I read or watch films about World War II, and about the Jewish people who died.

■ What questions do you want to ask the text when you have read it?

The German soldiers knew what they did to their own race "HUMANS". Why did they kill children who are like angels and innocent?

■ Do you think Major Trapp was right or wrong when he gave the soldiers the offer to step aside and not participate in the murders? Why/why not?

Maybe all Germans were not Nazis. There were those who didn't want to kill; they were forced to do it. Germany had hard times after World War I, and the economy collapsed. The worse economy in a country, the more extreme gets the politics. Trapp did the right thing when he said that to the soldiers. Maybe many of them didn't dare or many didn't want to kill.

First, student 1 describes what is in the text in an objective and neutral way. Then her response gets deeply personal when she discusses whether the text is relevant and meaningful for her. It seems as though the student has experienced war, and therefore her deep and personal response. She describes a strong feeling and that she gets a pain in her heart from the content in the text. She gives perceptions of right or wrong and the inviolability of human life a strong and present representation. The student also accentuates her experiences from the fact that the enemy not only tries to kill, but also to annex and take over the native country. This description gives an experience of belonging to a country and an identity, which appears to be dependent on meaning. The student experiences violations of values in the violations of life, but also a sense of belonging.

When it comes to what questions the student would like to ask, her ideas contain questions and a reflection over the Germans' actions. She argues and underscores the incredibility of killing people and especially children, but expresses also the ability to interpret the historical context.

■ What is history for you? Explain.

History is knowledge that can help us to not make mistakes that we have done before, to improve things that were not very good. History is also interesting. To learn how it was in the past.

■ Can history and/or history teaching explain what is right-wrong, freedom- not freedom? How? Or, why not?

The winner writes history, a mighty and powerful person or a country. There is always in history a winner and a loser. The winner is the author.

There is always something right and something wrong in history and in narratives.

- Should history and/or history teaching handle/contain right-wrong, good-evil, democracy or freedom? Why/why not?

  It could contain whatever. What has happened, has happened. Now we can learn not to do the same mistakes as people have done before, and that which is unfair. We must not do the same mistakes again.

The questions are formulated and framed for an analysis of the students' historical consciousness. The answers indicate expressions for a clear existential relation to the past when the student relates to her own experiences and her own history. Based on that, she interprets the content in Browning's book. In that way she expresses a narrative competence when translating the excerpt from the book to a context she can relate to. The translation makes meaning for her and the responses are quite elaborated. The student reflects on which history is told when saying that the winner always writes history. In that sense she reflects on the subjectivity in writing history. At the same time her answer mirrors a knowledge-based approach when discussing issues regarding right – wrong, freedom and rights, and that we can learn and not repeat mistakes.

An overall analysis of the answers from Student 1 meet to a high degree the types that I have described for historical consciousness. The student expresses an obvious existential relation to the past, not least when referring to her personal memories and experiences. She also shows a relation to history based on knowledge of the past, usable for avoiding those disastrous mistakes made in the past. This means a knowledge-based relation to the past.

The moral aspects are of course totally dominating in the text and in the questions. The student identifies them easily and reflects over them. She connects to her own experiences and opinions about war and hardships, which I argue are based on and express a historical as well as a moral consciousness. In addition, she interprets the narrative and presents her understanding of the historical context, a context that is valid also to her own experiences. The reflections are made out of the present, but past and future contexts are also expressed.

Student 2 III:12

- How do you perceive the story? What does it say to you?

  Terrible. How could there be people thinking that way. It is a very dark day and the situation as such is sick. But there is one positive sign in the text and that is when Trapp asks about who can't or will not be able to do it. But he does all this only for his own people. He is actually terrible to the Jewish people.

- Is the text relevant (does it make sense) to you? Why/why not?

  Yes, it is. It affects me deeply. It is unbelievable that there was/is those who really thought/think in this way. That they were so cold and with no feelings. It is something that is so terrible with human beings. Some people just do what is best for themselves. They never think about what happens to other people and how they suffer.

- What questions do you want to ask the text when you have read it? Why Jewish people?

- Do you think Major Trapp was right or wrong when he gave the soldiers the offer to step aside and not participate in the murders? Why/why not?

   I think it was both right and wrong. Honestly, who wants to kill people? Deep down I don't think that very many want to do it. But Trapp did the right thing and asked, but I think that he did it for his own good and because it had to be done.

The student reacts strongly and shows a deep disgust toward what the Nazis did. She lets her reasoning take off from the immediate event in the book, as well as considers people with similar thoughts today. When she discusses that some people just do what is best for themselves, without regarding their responsibility to others, her reflections correspond to general or universal values such as the right to life, safety, responsibility and solidarity.

Another aspect of the reasoning of the student is that she goes beyond the text in the book and reflects over why Major Trapp acts as he actually did. She variegates the view of how Major Trapp acts and regards this acting from two perspectives. Student 2 means that he did both what was right and what was wrong. Her interpretation is that Trapp mainly wants to save his own conscience, and his own moral consciousness. The arguments point out that she sees a wider context than that Trapp's offer is solely good. She seems to understand the context, when writing that Trapp was aware of that the Jewish people were to be killed anyway. This reasoning indicates a moral consciousness on a meta-level: a moral-based analysis of Major Trapp's (maybe) moral-based actions.

- What is history for you? Explain.

   What has happened earlier, in the past. Why society looks as it does today.

- <u>Can</u> history and/or history teaching explain what is right-wrong, freedom- not freedom? How? Or, why not?

- Should history and/or history teaching be about right-wrong, good-evil, democracy or freedom? Why/why not?

   History should contain important events and what is important. Then you can interpret it on your own and as you like. I think it should contain both, right and wrong. Because you can learn what the differences are, comparisons, making it so that more people get insight into what evil is and what good is.

Student 2 writes in two passages perceptions of the past and the present as interrelated, which she demonstrates by writing "was/is" and "thought/think". My interpretation is that the phenomenon in the past as well as the phenomenon in the present arouse wonder, because of the inhuman acts as such and because people have not learned. The perspectives on history mean here, with my descriptions, an existential relation to the past where the past and the present are linked. In other words an encounter of contexts.

A second perspective holds when the student discusses the importance of insight, knowledge about certain facts and that the student sees comparisons between good and evil. If history is about important events and processes, the student means that it might be interpreted by each and every one and also in different ways. The knowledge is central and the knowledge-based relation is illustrated.

Student 2 represents an existential relation to the past. Her reasoning is characterized by empathy and also highlights the relation between the situation today and the situation in the past. The reactions are based on knowledge and insight, and this is what the student underscores as important subject-content in history. The student explains that one can interpret and make one's own perceptions based on knowledge, make a knowledge-based stance as a foundation for interpretation and understanding. Linked to this, the student means that knowledge about history makes it possible to understand why society looks as it does today. She also writes about the moral content from several aspects. Student 2 is engaged in the issues and questions how humans can act, and even think, in this way. The reflections span over time and testify to a moral commitment of assassinations of Jewish people as an unacceptable stance.

Conclusions and further questions

Human beings are intertwined in history and moral reasoning. The students in this pilot study immediately perceive the historical contexts and relate to personal experiences or general moral values. Their reasoning gathers both the historical context and the present context. Even lessons we must learn for the future are emphasized, which indicates the students' historical consciousness.

I can discern two tendencies: The student with putative personal experiences of war (student 1) points to the importance of learning from the past. Her answers bring the message to the future, built on experiences from the past. The existential and knowledge-based strands of historical consciousness are linked to a moral consciousness characterized by responsibility for the future. At the same time she dilates the historical context and describes the situation in Germany as a possible explanation to the extreme politics during World War II. This is an important indication of how knowledge is linked to interpretation and a narrative competence. Student 2 also expresses her narrative competence when she interprets the past and the present as simultaneously topical by using the words "was/is" and "thought/think". Her discussion about learning by comparisons is an example of a knowledge-based view of the past. She states that historical knowledge is the way to open the eyes for what is evil and what is good. Student 2 discusses whether Major Trapp did the right thing when he let the soldiers choose. Her reasoning points at general moral values: "Honestly, who wants to kill people?" and in that way she relates to moral reasoning without a specific time or context, not even especially connected to the Holocaust as such, to WWII or to other genocides. However her discussion is nuanced when she ends up saying that Trapp did the right thing, but he did it for his own good. Her moral consciousness is analytical as well as based on her moral conceptions.

Points of convergence?

The concepts I present as points of convergence seem to be reasonable. Meaning is a central concept and phenomenon. The content makes sense and stimulates reactions and arguments. The events in the past are highly relevant for the students today, which is obvious in their reasoning. The reflections get multifaceted and rich. The students reflect on what history is as well as over the specific narrative and the events described. What happened in the past and what happens today is discussed as a concatenated and integrated reflection.

My assumption of context as a central point of convergence seems important, but difficult to identify. The students discuss Major Trapp's acting in a wider context, and it seems as though the context inspires opening up for new or other contexts, even not in immediate relation to the content.

The discussion above raises further questions: Are the concepts hierarchical? How are they connected? Is meaning the foundation for reflecting and is the context the essence to reflect upon? Is, on the contrary, reflection the tool to identify and experience meaning? Are the points of convergence related to each other in different ways?

Figure 1

The tentative connections between historical consciousness and moral consciousness – by way of students' reasoning – must be followed up in large-scale studies with clear-cut categories as analytical tools. This study indicates that there are connections. Are the connections valid or just random results from a limited sample?

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Endnotes

[1] The Swedish Research Council: Rules and guidelines for research, see codex.vr.se.

Historical and moral consciousness in the light of ethics of dissensus: One approach to handle plurality in education

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ABSTRACT: In the light of current tendencies where the fear of foreigners is increasing in seemingly stably democratic societies. This paper aims to revive the presence of the body as a central condition and experience for human interaction. The body as an inevitable source for conscious/unconscious responses to others helps to understand how various forms of violence such as xenophobia and hate crimes come into expression. The purpose of this contribution is to theoretically explore and empirically exemplify the relationship between *historical consciousness and moral consciousness* as an educational concern by turning to the writings of Ewa Ziarek and her notion of ethics of dissensus. Through the concept of ethics of dissensus she brings a fresh dimension into the discussion of how the relationship between historical and moral consciousness can be understood. She does this by providing concepts and understandings of how (history) education can be approached without overlooking the complicated presence of difference between the past-present-future, between two subjects and between the inner and the outer life. Accordingly, Ziarek's reasoning suggests the need to leave the simplified playing field of 'either-or' and engage in the communicative negotiation that constitutes the fragile middle-ground between two extreme poles in history education.

KEYWORDS: democracy, emancipation, plurality, ethics of dissensus, historical and moral consciousness, teachers' responsibilities.

Introduction

This paper aims to theoretically explore the relationship between *historical consciousness* and *moral consciousness* as an educational concern by turning to the writings of Ewa Ziarek (2001) and her notion of ethics of dissensus. In this paper ethics and morals are used as interconnected entities seeing that moral action is an expression of a specific ethical reasoning (Fox & DeMarco, 2001). Ziarek's understanding of ethics begins by highlighting an absence in ethical theory. According to her, mainstream moral reasoning overlooks how everyday violence such as hate-crimes, xenophobia, exclusion and devaluing of those who are conceived as different, are created due to the fact that people are a) irreducibly different from one and other and are forced to live with that difference, and b) that people's thoughts and actions are unavoidably tinted by irrational expressions that do not fully disappear with knowledge or maturity. The ethics she presents thus takes into account the consequences of people's everyday embodied responses to Others' life situation; and this paper seeks to explore how this particular way of making meaning out of ethics can be linked to historical and moral consciousness and also what it might demand of teachers' responsibilities in education.

The importance of paying regard to history in order to grapple with the present and an elusive future is emphasized from many directions, not the least in research addressing social justice and the desire to contest various kinds of injustice. In the research addressing the experiences

and conditions of people and groups of people it is frequently pointed out that universalism, neutrality and de-contextual approaches to history and morality are insufficient to handle different forms of injustices and accordingly that issues concerning plurality, context, and embodiment are imperative to address (see for instance, Coole, 1993; Cudd, 2006; Fanon, 1963; Lloyd, 1983; Pinar, 2008; Said, 1994). It is argued here that one means in which to oppose the harm of individuals and groups of people is by becoming aware of how present individuals' life conditions are unavoidably entangled in past goings-on and how this awareness opens up possibilities to change the future for the better (Pinar, 2012). Violence towards those who are considered as different from a group's norms has probably existed as long as there have been humans, but it has taken different expressions and has been more or less accepted depending on time and context (see for instance Chenoweth, Lawrence, & Stathis, 2010; Estrada, 2010; Sifton, 2015).

At the end of the Second World War, Europe and other western countries came to an agreement that the large scale brutalities of the two wars needed to be counteracted by creating a democratic system and hence a space in which plurality was considered as an essential dimension vital to protect (Weedon, 1999, chapter 1). This does not mean all democratic nations look the same or that violence in democratic countries is erased. Rather what is stressed here is that democracy as a political system carries with it an ambition to pay regard to pluralism, counteract violence, and secure peace contrary to many other political systems. Approximately half of the earth's population live in democracies (Economist, 2014) and many countries today strive to become democracies (Pharr & Putnam, 2000). After the Second World War, education in Sweden was singled out as one of the most important organs to foster democratic citizens and guarantee that the cruelty of war was to be kept at a distance (SOU, 1948, p. 27). The democratic communities aiming to secure peace and justice that were established after 1945 are however very fragile, seeing that violence is a multifaceted phenomenon that can come into expression in various ways. Rather than adhering to mainstream reasoning claiming that various forms of violence can be categorized and combated isolated from one and other Hamby and Grynch (2013) show in their study how violence is created in the flow of life in ways that interconnects various dimensions and levels, such as individual, social, and political. This implies more attentiveness to the consequences in the present where the borders between care and cruelty are so easy to cross (Igra, 2011) and violence takes form through an intersection of various fields such as terrorism and war, everyday racism, hate-speech, violation, and discrimination, and through the consequences of political and economic systems - where some political and economic systems risks harming certain groups of people more than others (e.g.Young, 1990; Žižek, 2008).

Although a majority of the European population remains in favor of democracy, many countries with a long experience of democracy face an increased dissatisfaction with this form of governing today (Dalton, 2004; Hay, 2007; Mair, 2913; Pharr & Putnam, 2000; Putnam, 2000; Stoker, 2010) as well as an upsurge of intolerance and violence towards those who are considered as foreigners (BRÅ, 2014; Fernbrant, 2013). Parallel with these trends various societies are to a higher degree than previous ones are influenced by simplified populist rhetoric based on a binary logic of black and white that risks leading to extreme standpoints of what is right and wrong in ways that overlook nuances in social life (Lukacs, 2005), and universalism due to various conjoined forces such as conservatism and nationalism that share similar characteristics, namely to preserve a single order in ways that oppose plurality (Apple, 2011; Stephen J Ball, 2008). This, without claiming that there are not differences between various advocators of conservatism and nationalism. The moral implications that can be learnt from history constitutes one important responsibility for education to prepare citizens willing to fight for a peaceful future (Karlegärd, 1984; Rüsen, 2001). Using democracy and the desire to oppose various forms of violence as a foreshadow it becomes of interest to re-examine how moral

consciousness and historical consciousness in education can be understood and developed in ways that does not overlook plurality and embodied reactions.

Drawing on Ewa Ziarek's ethics of dissensus this paper asks how a connection between history and ethics in education can be comprehended that does not overlook the presence of the embodied Other? More precisely: a) How does Ziarek describe an ethics of dissensus in relation to moral and historical consciousness, b) what kind of teacher responsibilities can be drawn from her specific relationship between history and ethics, and c) how does the connection between ethics of dissensus, and dissensus of history described by Ziarek contribute in understanding the relationship between moral and historical consciousness in education?

This paper is divided into three parts: a background, results and a discussion/conclusion. In the background an overview of the concepts moral consciousness and historical consciousness is discussed in relation to the notion of plurality. In the second part of the paper the link between morality and history is examined by highlighting Ewa Ziarek's descriptions of an ethics of dissensus and its bonds to history. Furthermore, the reasoning is here placed in affiliation to teacher responsibilities exemplified by empirical examples. The paper ends with a brief discussion where the results are placed in dialogue to previous research about moral consciousness and historical consciousness.

The question of plurality in relation to moral and historical consciousness

This section discusses the place and features of plurality within the fields of moral and historical consciousness. Plurality is here grasped as a question of group difference, as a difference between unique individuals (Mouffe, 2000) and as a difference between the individuals' conscious and subconscious image of self (Todd, 2003). This suggests that plurality, from a historical perspective can also be about both past historical perspectives and plural ways of grasping the past in the present (Klein, 2010).From this way of reasoning plurality, in itself, is neither good nor bad, comes in many forms and is an intrinsic and thus unavoidable part of human life and every social order. What needs to be stressed though is that there are major differences in how social orders – including education – have approached the presence of plurality.

Documentations of history and morality can be understood as human made *narratives of history*. The word narrative signals that history and moral in a sense are human fabrications through language. Klein (2010) distinguishes between *open* and *closed narratives*. A closed narrative of history, and morality can be comprehended as a story that forces a universal and narrow meaning of the past, and right/wrong without questioning what is excluded and included in that narrative. Contrary to a closed narrative an open narrative pays regard to various stories that make it possible to approach historical phenomena, and moral from various angles that render the multilayered creation and re-creation of communities to become visible. In the very brief overview of research regarding moral and historical consciousness and their relationship to plurality can be interpreted with the help of the concepts *closed narratives* and *open narratives*.

Moral consciousness and plurality

Moral consciousness can broadly be described as: "(1) capacity – one's fundamental ability to discern good and evil, (2) process – as the discovering of what makes for being a good person, what particular action is right and wrong, the process of being formed and informed, and (3) judgment – following inquiry and leading to judgment…The word conscience is defined as a state of moral awareness a compass directing our behavior according to the moral fitness of

things" (Smith, 2013, p. 179). Central in moral consciousness theories is that moral responsibility only can be asked by those who are conscious of their actions towards others. This implies that a person hurting another unconsciously cannot be held responsible for her or his actions (King & Carruthers, 2012).

There is no single theory of moral consciousness rather it is constituted from various ideas ranging from care theories to justice theories. However, the most dominant perspective of moral consciousness is influenced by a closed narrative stemming from developmental psychology drawing on positivism, where universality, impartiality, prescriptivity, and reversibility are regarded as key concepts (ibid). From this sense, morality is viewed as an ability in every human being's mind that can be stimulated and developed in a similar fashion, following universal developmental steps independent of person and context. Morality, in this way of arguing, is regarded as a purely cognitive endeavor based on formalism and universalism that does not take the situations, reactions and sentiments of unique individuals into deliberation. Accordingly, it is possible of being deemed as moral without taking the consequences of one's actions towards others into consideration. A front figure of *moral consciousness* is Lawrence Kohlberg whose ideas are influenced by Meads' pragmatism and John Rawls' theory of natural law. Kohlberg's way of reasoning has been found appealing by those who regard the need to reduce empirical variation of moral perspectives and as such presenting a moral theory that clearly distinguishes between rationally predefined right and wrong moral judgment (e.g. Habermas, 1990, pp., 117, 119, 120). Gilligan's (1977) and later Noddings' (2003) ethics of care has played a significant role in re-shaping the ethical landscape by opening up ethics for the presence, feelings and experiences of a unique individual. Drawing on Hume amongst others, their way of introducing relations and the unique Other has not only added a new dimension to the field of ethics, but has also indirectly shaken the very ground on which it rests. They have widened the narrative of moral consciousness by introducing the element of the unknown, which eludes any attempt to fix and isolate ethics to a specific foundation. Although the ethics of care opens up a way of approaching ethics without overlooking unique people's everyday responses and feelings, it never fully leaves the platform of a foundation-enabling progression (Edling, 2009; Smith, 2013) and as such subsumes that the Other can be known and consequently de-Othered (Todd, 2003).This implies that the logic of moral consciousness – although important – is not enough to handle some forms of plurality.

Historical consciousness and plurality

Just as the notion universalism and impartiality have dominated the field of moral reasoning, attempts to understand history has been characterized by a desire to form fragmented views of history into a single one in order to develop a sense of group identity with the purpose to strengthen the glory of the nation. A desire to universalize European history started during the era of Enlightenment under the eighteenth century and was followed by a search for general laws in the nineteenth century. The process took place parallel with the building of the nation-state that required the creation of a collective identity of faithful and obedient citizens. Subsequently, shaping the history of human kind into a collective and ideal identity in service of the nation can be regarded as state power that glued various people in a country together in ex-change for citizenship rights (e.g. Vanhaute, 2013, pp., 17, 81).

The concept *historical consciousness* was established towards the end of 20th century by Karl-Ernst Jeismann, a historian within the field of curriculum studies. (Eikeland, 1999). Historical consciousness can generally be described as the mental connections between of the past, present, and future, i.e. how people individually and socially make sense of how it has been, how it is, and how it could be. The roots of historical consciousness is intimately interlaced with the progress of German *didaktik* in the 1960s and with critical theory primarily

linked to the ideas of Jürgen Habermas and Herbert Marcuse. One central aspect in their reasoning was the need to use education as a platform for emancipation which indirectly opens up history education to plurality of world-views and a desire to change the world for the better. Moreover, it stressed the need to pay regard to the unique individuals interpretation of self and their position in a world with others (e.g. Ammert, 2008, p. 41).

Debates to open up history education to a plurality of worldviews is not a new phenomenon but has been advocated for by those who have found their group or group perspectives excluded from the canon of history, such as women, black people, religious groups, working class people, and so forth (see for instance Burnett, Vincent, & Mayall, 1984; Fanon, 1982; Hirdman, 2004; Said, 1994; Scott, 1988; Wollstonecraft, 1975). In recent years the discussions have gained new fuel in the aftermath of globalization and migration (Seixas, 2007; Shemilt, 2000). Yet, how the presence of plurality is to be grasped and understood in history education is however not obvious. Whereas, some maintain that it is important to listen to various sometimes controversial historical narratives in order to single out the most rational one (e.g. Billman-Mahecha & Hausen, 2005; Habermas, 1990; Straub, 2005) others indicate that plurality is not just a nice narrative that can be objectively scrutinized and at times dismissed, but a force that nestles into the grand narratives and rupture them from within (Seixas, 2005). More precisely, whereas, critical pedagogy influenced by for instance Habermas argue for the need to create rational platforms where plural world-views and unique individuals' meaning-making are allowed space, others, such as, Seixas (2005) and Simon (2004) move the discussion of plurality further by arguing that there is no neutral platform where plural world-views are simply added to the debate in an ordered fashion. On the contrary according to them, plurality is often a force that breaks into various orders and ruptures them from within. In other words, history education, and morality is not merely about creating consensus from fragments but also about being aware that antagonism cannot be erased just hidden. Antagonism is created due to the fact that plural world-views exist in ways that logically cannot be forged together as a whole and as such tends to disturb the process of creating unity. Every seemingly objective judgement contains from this standpoint power-relationships that need to be taken into account since they cannot be fully tamed or erased. The progression of history is from this way of reasoning set in constant motion, i.e. ruptured, critical historical consciousness inverts given power relations by affirming the agency of the subaltern/.../it demonstrates the potential historical agency of those groups that were hidden and marginalized in traditional historical accounts. In so doing it may lead to fragmentation of the grand narratives that organized the progressive past of exemplary history" (Seixas, 2005, p. 148).

This reasoning has however also been questioned for demanding too much of teachers seeing that an openness to a plurality of perspectives is an openness to complexity and dangers of relativism. As such, the notion of plurality in education pleads for a critical awareness and dialogue about the past and its relation to the present (Barton & Levstik, 2004) which in Pinar's terms (2012) can be referred to as a plea for keeping a complicated conversation alive. The objective of this paper is to probe further into how this complicated conversation can be stimulated in education by turning the attention to the ethics of dissensus and its relationship to history.

Ethics of dissensus in relation to moral and historical consciousness placed in an educational context

Ethics of dissensus should by no means be understood as a superior ethical theory that should exchange other ethical theories, but rather be seen as an ongoing dialogue in understanding the unavoidable presence of radical plurality in ethical relationships. The ethics in question can be

grasped as a response to the absence of tools within the field of ethics of care and ethics of justice to approach various forms of social violence that stems from embodied reactions, where the conscious never can be fully separated from the unconscious manifested in xenophobia, hate speech, discrimination, and oppression. What is particularly lacking in ethics, Ziarek maintains, is the ability to pay regard to and process disturbing forces in societies like hostility, aggression, and power in ethical relations. The concept dissensus thus refers to the counter pole of consensus, and directs attention to people's fragmented embodied meaning making, which she maintains is essential to take into account if social violence is to be addressed and opposed: "To underscore this conflictual articulation of ethics, I deploy the neologism —dissensus (from the Latin dissension, disagreement, struggle; the opposite of consensus) to refer to the irreducible dimension of antagonism and power in discourse, embodiment, and democratic politics" (Ziarek, 2001, p. 1).

Two approaches to the role and responsibilities of teachers have dominated the educational debate, namely the *universal* (technical) and *practice oriented* (intellectual) *approach*. The two concepts should not be understood in dualistic terms but rather as two different epistemological and ontological starting-points for approaching the notion of teacher responsibility. The universal perspective is founded on a dualistic platform, a belief that everything's and everyone's essence can be located and that uncertainties and dilemmas in education can be erased. From the universal standpoint it is important that teachers base their education on empirical findings and nothing else (Ball, 1995). This view was strong in Sweden during the 1950s and 1960s, but experiences a renaissance in current time not the least due to the negative results of the PISA tests (Edling, 2014; Edling & Frelin, 2014). Contrary to the universal approach to teachers' responsibilities the practice oriented (intellectual) approach regard education as a living organism constituted out of specific contexts and relationships that requires teachers who are present and able to interpret and make deliberative judgment in the flow of everyday relationships. The latter does not imply that universal or technical approaches are unnecessary, merely that they cannot be applied without first judging the situation of the present (Ahlström, 1993; Stephen J. Ball, 1995; Colnerud & Granström, 2002; Fransson, 2012; Frelin, 2010).

The ethics of dissensus and its relation to history described by Ziarek can be regarded as a contribution to a practice oriented approach to teachers' responsibilities opening up to complicated conversations. Pinar (2012) describes a complicated conversation as a form of dialogue in which numerous variables are placed in relation to one and other, such as previous knowledge, students' different experiences, facts, feelings, the past, present, future, and also the gaps between them. Placing Ziarek's description of ethics and history in relation to teachers' responsibilities in education a) obliges teachers' to acknowledge certain aspects in education, b) encourage them to oscillate between intimacy and distance, and c) to stimulate certain traits that allow the complicated conversation to be kept alive.

In this section the notion of *ethics of dissensus* and its affiliation to *history* is presented and discussed in relationship to teachers' responsibilities in education. Every occasion in which Ziarek mentions history in relation to ethics in the book has been analyzed. The findings in these categories have continually been placed in connection to what they might bring to education and teachers' responsibilities.

Ethics of dissensus and moral consciousness in relation to teachers' responsibilities

> And conversely, what kind of ethics is necessary in order to assure us, in Seyla Benhabib's words that "the agon of…or the contest of pluralism that cannot be adjudicated at the higher levels, will all be instances of good and just democratic politics as opposed to being instances of fascism, xenopohobic: nationalism, right-wing politics (Ziarek, 2001, p. 64).

The ethics of dissensus is juxtaposed primarily of Emmanuel Lévinas *ethics of alterity* but is kept in dialogue with feminist and race theories stemming from Michel Foucault's notion of power, and psychoanalysis. Seeing that different forms of violence generally are created due to re-occurring difficulties of handling people's otherness Emmanuel Lévinas ethics of alterity plays a significant role in Ziarek's reasoning. Lévinas' questions the implicit acceptance of violence that exist in classical ethical theories in their way of defining who is human and who is not. Defining who is human and who is not indirectly signal who is worth saving and who can be disposed as garbage testified by the brutality of the Second World War (e.g. ibid, p. 72 see also Lévinas, 1981, p. 203).

Although consciousness, which Lévinas refers to as 'the for itself' is not only important but necessary in societies in order to make meaning, the ethical responsibility cannot be trapped in this consciousness but stem from an area outside it. If ethics solely would be a question of consciousness implies that the subject is isolated in herself, in her ego, and subsequently unable to allow the Other's presence to touch her. The Other with a capital 'O' signals a recognition of absolute alterity or difference between subjects. Following, Ziarek's reading of Lévinas people are always more than their consciousness since they, whether they want to or not, exist in their bodies (the in itself) that inevitably are expose to the world: "what is remarkable in Levinas's later work is that the possibility of ethical responsibility is located not in consciousness or free will but specifically in incarnation, defined as the extreme way of being exposed" (ibid, p. 49-50).

Hence, "embodiment", "living flesh", "embodied ego" or "ipseity" - an identity that exceeds consciousness, as described by Lévinas is central in the ethics of dissensus. Embodiment is both a *condition* and an *experience* in that it sets the frame sentiments/desires/drives/thoughts – in ways that affect others' life situation – and also is the only medium through which a subject can experience the world since an escape from our bodies is impossible (ibid, p. 49-50). If a person is physically irritated by, for instance refugees and beggars, the irritation stems from the subject's own body but risk erupting in everyday life in ways that influence the situation of the beggar or the refugee negatively. If difference, regarded as both as an unbridgeable difference, between subjects and between the subjects' conscious and subconscious, is to be taken seriously it implies that the progression, unanimity, and identity formation as a (sole) focus for teachers becomes insufficient since identity merely targets 'who I am' or 'whom I desire to be', and not 'how I respond' towards the Other' and 'how the Other affects my image of self' in an ongoing process.

The logic that Ziarek reasoning awakens is the need to leave the simplified playing field of 'either-or' and engage in the communicative negotiation in education that constitute the fragile middle-ground between two extreme poles such as fixed facts or fluctuating subjectivities or the conscious and the unconscious (e.g. Biesta & Säfström, 2011; Säfström, 2011). This way of reasoning requires teachers who are able to navigate in this middle-ground and oscillate between the said such as past knowledge about various events, policies and past experiences and to the questions, reactions, and sentiments that are in the saying in-front and around them. It also implies moving between cognitive judgment calling for well-grounded arguments and eschatological judgment based on sensing and touch in the present (see also Edling and Frelin, 2016). A teacher deemed to be good at his work expressed in an interview conducted by Frelin (2014) the balance act as follows: "J: I perceive myself as very sensitive to what's happening on the other side, for example, by seeing a facial expression. If I tell [a child to work a bit more], and then look [into her face], is it failure I see? Or is it [an expression conveying] 'Okay. I'll work a bit more.' (Interview 1, lines 257–258, p. 6).

In order, to describe the difference between conscious representation, which is vital to social human beings, and the ethics of alterity that represents a hope for non-violent relations, time

plays a key role. Lévinas distinguishes between the *said* and the *saying*. Social representation is based on the *past said* and often used as a source for orientation and making judgment in form of knowledge banks, such as acts, written regulations and so forth. However, people tend to forget or ignore that the said is created out of a *present saying* and perhaps even more crucial that the never seizing present sayings impact on the world in the shadow of the said. In order to be affected by the Other the conscious *said* is insufficient. Indeed, the possibility of being affected or touched by the Other depends on the *saying*: "the saying, by contrast, reveals a different sense of sensibility and describes it as the capacity for being affected by the Other" (ibid, p. 51). Accordingly, the conscious representation of the world is unavoidable and constantly interwoven with the saying expressed through bodily drives and desires which influences the conditions of people. From this way of reasoning ethics cannot be dislocated from passion that breaks into intentionality and consciousness rupturing them from within: "just as the trace of the Other is incommensurate with the order of the said, so too the recurrence of the flesh, the passive synthesis of aging, evades the time of consciousness". Combining Lévinas ethics of alterity with Irigaray, Lacan, and Kristeva's psychoanalysis, Ziarek uses Jürgen Harbermas' discourse ethics as an example in order to problematize an ethics that solely is based on conscious reasoning. In accordance to her a purely conscious handling of plurality in ethical theories is insufficient since it overlooks the way the unconscious (the inner plurality) nestles into communications and disturbs it expressed for instance through feelings of dislike, fear, hatred, and irritation. The presence of the body also implies a need to move between conscious statements and the way the unconscious nestles into seemingly rational claims.

The interplay between conscious/subconscious requires the ability to look back to what have been said and done retrospectively and amend plausible damages for the sake of others. For instance: "You keep returning to the fact that you are irritated that the history book and my history lessons mention the role of homosexuals at various times in history. Can you elaborate on that irritation/can you elaborate on *why you feel* this?" For this reason she argues that there needs to be an ethics that takes this unavoidable disruption created through the movement between the inner and outer life seriously:

> Specifically, the acknowledgement of the economy of drive in the intersubjective field not only foregrounds the passionate, ambivalent, and unconscious aspects of communication usually ignored by the ethics of communicative rationality…In place of identification the disjunction between the outward and the inward movement of the drive dramatizes not only the heterogeneity of the subject but also the asymmetry in the subject's relation to the Other (ibid, p. 144).

By dislocating ethics from the *dominance* of consciousness the playing field of ethics shifts from only focusing on abstract guidelines and rules to the feeling of responsibility that comes with opening up for the presence of the (embodied) Other. This implies an awareness that teachers (and pupils) do not only have given responsibilities but are also vulnerable for felt responsibilities (Edling & Frelin, 2013) that highlights a sensing dimension in education (Edling & Frelin, 2016). The learning from the Other can take form by letting pupils to unconditionally listen to the stories of for instance victims of wars and the stories of their perpetrators in history lessons and see what dimensions of human interaction they awaken (Todd, 2003). With the help of Lévinas, Ziarek argues that the awakened responsibility can be either ignored or embraced. Whereas, classical ethical theories rooted in consciousness limits responsibility, the ethics of alterity is limitless and anarchic. If moral is understood as the imperative of 'treating others as one self wants to be treated' then responses to others following this principle can give a sense of fulfillment; a sense of being moral. On the contrary, Lévinas anarchic and limitless responsibility describes the responsibility that is born when passively encountering the face of an Other, for example when a subject becomes a face beyond conscious labels such as pupil, beggar, refugee, or neighbor but a presence exterior to ourselves pleading to be sensed and with a capability of touching us if we actively open up (become passive). By

being held hostage by the Other's presence, responsibility becomes limitless and anarchic – no one can decide for the subject what needs to be done or when s/he has done enough (e.g. ibid, p. 60-61).

'History of dissensus' in relation to historical consciousness and teachers' responsibilities

In order to understand the connection between an ethics that pays regard to the existence of the Other and history Ziarek turns to feminism, race theory, and Foucault's notion of power. What she mainly problematizes is how the seemingly homogenous and causal representations of history seizes to acknowledge past violence against those who diverge from governing norms (ibid, p. 19). The process of emancipation during the era of enlightenment express the dilemma of wanting to free oppressed groups from hegemonic domination while speaking in the name of a group and as such eliminating differences within the groups (ibid, p. 107). History treated as causal representation has a long history similar to causality in moral developmental theories. Yet, in the process of capturing the flow of life in causal terms, which Bentham's utilitarianism drew to its extreme the embodied Other is transformed into a number that can be disposed in the name of the human good: "by ascribing a proper function even to human waste, Jeremy Bentham's project *panopticon* is one of the paradigmatic examples of how the utilitarian notion of causality eliminates contingency for the sake of efficiency and calculability" (ibid, p. 19). While modern historicism begins in the disciplining the "self-reflective subject" to locate "lost truths of the past" Ziarek shifts focus to a historical will to keep impossible conversations of the past alive that juggles shadows of past events and a desire to knit the fragmented events into something coherent (ibid, p. 27).

> As we have seen the critique of the soul reveals a complicity between the historical will to knowledge, fantasy consolidating identity, and the disciplinary formation of moral conscience/…/These paralles among modern historicism grounded in the figure of the self-reflective subject, the formation of moral conscience, and the soul are likewise an effect of a certain reflective turn of the reactive forces of punishment upon the subject ibid, p. 29).

Leaning on Foucault, Ziarek maintains that central in theories about historical and moral consciousness is to teach subjects to discipline their thoughts and behaviors in ways deemed as socially desirable. The disciplinary function of both historical and moral consciousness referred to as subjugating reflexivity, can be regarded as an important part in social life but is far from sufficient in order to oppose inter-personal violence. What is needed to challenge of the disciplinary dominance of history and ethics is, according to Ziarek, to move from developing certain identities to acknowledge "the divergence within the subject" and how this divergence creates antagonism that disturbs rational reasoning (ibid, p. 29, 30). She emphasizes that it is not a question of merely complaining about the past but rather about engaging in an experimental dialogue about how the future can be imagined in ways that deals with past wrongs. This experimental dialogue also, implicitly, invites the subject to ponder about how s/he can constantly re-image her or himself to become anew (ibid, p. 40-41), i.e. 'do I act in a way that stimulates violence, if so how could I change for the sake of others?' She also uses Casteroidis's *social imaginary* and *radical imaginary* to exemplify this. The social imaginary is an ordered image of the world that society imposes on us while the radical imaginary can be understood as people's capability to think beyond the given (ibid, p. 155).

Leaning on Foucault, Ziarek makes a distinction between *consciousness* and *continuity* contra *events* and *series* that discursively dictates what is to be seen as true knowledge at a certain point in time. Whereas, the former gives a sense of determinism to history the concepts events and series acknowledge the fragmented side of history that always is tinted by power relations. That is, whose experiences should be part of the big picture and whose should be excluded? Through Foucault's research about sexuality and madness he shows how perceptions

of madness and sexuality change over time and how power relations in that perception dictates the conditions for people at that time. It is subsequently not a question of objectivism versus relativism at stake here but rather how the evidence presented by Foucault can be grappled with (e.g. ibid, p. 18). With this as a background Ziarek maintains that the possibility to resist perceptions that harm people or groups of people lies in acknowledging how history itself is formed through the interweaving of visibility and signification (articulation) (ibid, p. 19 see also p. 162) that can be compared to Lévinas' concepts said and saying.

Ziarek struggles with the problem of judgment that difference (e.g. the different, the Other) poses ethics and history: "how do we respond to an injustice merely by the alarm of feeling? This is indeed the central ethico-political dilemma the differend poses for hegemonic politics" (ibid, p. 95). The dilemma can be described as follows: on the one hand rational criterions helps legitimizing judgment on the other hand it does not matter if a judgment is legitimate if it harms people – at least if the aim is to reduce human suffering. Rather than being occupied with if a judgment is legitimate or not she emphasizes the importance of also stimulating an eschatological judgment. The eschatological judgment can be interpreted as a response to shortcomings to judge the horrors of the Second World War. It became evident that rational judgments *in themselves* are incapable of explaining, opposing and judging the tortures and extinctions of millions of people. Eschatological judgment is based on a careful examination of each unique case without placing it in relation to an external rule (all I did was to obey orders) or an illusion of historical totality (we did in the name of humanity emphasized even by the ancient Greeks) (e.g. ibid, p. 95).

Accordingly, although facts are important to acknowledge in history, Ziarek states that history cannot only be about scientific facts since it does not take into account the experience of suffering. In order to grapple with the dilemma of judging the differend (the Other) further she turns to Lyotard and his use of the Kantian *signs of history* and *facts of history*:

> The difference between the historical fact and the sign of history is all the more crucial since the appeal to 'historical evidence' has been used by "revisionist" historians such as Faurisson to deny the historical reality of the Holocaust and to silence the survivors testimony. For Lyotard, the Holocaust is the event that in the most singular way points to the political and moral crisis of modernity and thus necessitates the revision of the claim of history. The specific question that frames The Differend is how one listens to the testimonies of the inhumanity of Auschwitz, how one responds and bears witness to the destruction of reality and speech signified by this most catastrophic event of our time (ibid, p. 97).

Historical fact is the outcome of a collective forging verified fragmented pieces of a past into a hegemonic whole. The signs of history are what inevitably eludes the image of totality, i.e. that which always tends fall outside and cannot be captured in this fashion. For instance, a history book can proudly declare the supremacy of a nation's domination over another country while there is evidence of people experiencing the opposite (ibid, p. 96-97). By keeping a dialogue between signs and facts it becomes possible to connect to something shared while problematizing and at times rupturing it with the help of concrete experiences that helps prove the limits of the image of the hegemonic whole.

Allowing space for difference and radical imaginary does however not imply that every opinion is equally good in relation to various purposes. In a school for adults in Sweden one of the students claimed that there are proofs that the Holocaust did not exist and the teacher countered by pointing out the opposite. The student felt violated and the teacher was told by the responsible coordinator that he should not argue against the students' opinions the way he had done since everyone has the right of an opinion. Interpreting Ziarek's picture of history in relation to ethics of dissensus implies that the responsible coordinator is stuck in a dualistic or an either-or way of thinking that risks enhancing the harm against those who diverge from the norm rather than resisting it. Hence, existing in the middle field as teacher implies moving back

and forth from history of facts and history of signs in a never ending process that not only can lead to an awareness of limits in historical narratives but also involves a difficult questioning of one's own reactions and stand-points in relation to the Other.

A tentative conclusion

Ziarek reminds her readers that research about violence has shown that it is not enough to lean against one or some few models in education, seeing that each model is based on an inclusion/exclusion and also is created exterior to the flow of everyday life. Accordingly, a delicate balance act and a movement between dualistic assumptions that historically have been separated in an either-or fashion are required. By an either or thinking means here the tendency to regard, for instance teachers, as either theoretical or practical, either itty-witty/subjective or interested in facts, either a person who needs to ignore difference (plurality) or cherish it blindly and so forth. If the points Ziarek raises are to be taken seriously it obliges teachers to ponder about how they regard and handle issues of difference, embodiment (accompanied by the unconscious), power, and dilemmas in education. The reasoning she contributes with comes with specific directions and obligations for teachers, namely:

1. *Obliges teachers to stimulate*:
   - an honor of thinking amongst students, i.e. invite students and colleagues to join in understanding and handling the complicated puzzle that constitutes life
   - experimental praxis or dialogue amongst students based on trial and error

2. *Obliges the teacher to be aware of that*:
   - A contempt or ignorance of the Other risks enhancing violence and brutality towards those who diverge: important to learn from the Other
   - That we cannot escape from other bodies and that it therefore sets the condition for our existence with others as well as is the sole medium through which the world can be experienced
   - the unconscious tends to nestle into consciousness causing ruptures that needs to be acknowledged retrospectively for the sake of others
   - The forging of a unity (of history) always comes with exclusion and as such signals the presence of power relations
   - Dilemmas or antagonism is always present in education – at times hidden under a mantle of consensus
   - Identity (subject-in-process) and history (events and series) are fragmented and set in motion

3. *Importance of oscillating between:*
   - Saying/said
   - Social imaginary/radical imaginary
   - Facts of history/signs of history
   - Visibility/signification
   - Consciousness/unconsciousness
   - Cognitive judgment/eschatological judgment

Her reasoning bears a resemblance to open historical narratives where researchers, such as Seixas (2004) and Simon (2004) who problematize the belief in progression through historical

consciousness and argues that the presence of plurality tends to rupture history. Her philosophy can also be compared to those who argue that it is important pay more regard to complexity in history education (Barton & Levstik, 2004) and to stimulate a framework in education that allows the complexity and plural world-views to be dealt with critically (Boix-Mansilla, 2000; Lévesque, 2008; Shemilt, 2000; Wineburg, 2000). However, through the concept of ethics of dissensus where she brings a fresh dimension into the discussion by providing concepts and understandings of how (history) education can be approached without overlooking the complicated presence of difference between the past-present-future, between two subjects and between the inner and the outer life.Sub-Heading-2

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Acknowledgements

About the Author

Silvia Edling works as a Senior Lecturer/Associate Professor at the University of Gävle in Sweden. Her research, which is written within the field of Curriculum Studies is primarily directed upon exploring ethical aspects of democracy in education including ambitions to secure everyone's equal value and hence to contest different forms of violence and oppressive structures in society. In recent years Edling has come to be interested in teachers' possibilities to peruse democratic aspirations within the environments established at higher education. Subsequently, she shifts focus from young people's ethical experiences to possibilities of teacher professionalism and critical thinking that includes a desire to comprehend present endeavors through past experiences.

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Making democrats while developing their historical consciousness: A complex task

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ABSTRACT: History teaching in Sweden is, among other things, supposed to create democratic citizens appreciating certain values. These goals are described in the first chapter in the curriculum, "Fundamental values and tasks of the school", as cross-curricular goals that every teacher should foster. At the same time the history teacher is supposed to develop the students´ historical consciousness by developing certain cognitive abilities that allow the students to interpret history on their own. These abilities are described in the history syllabus. The abilities do not, however, address any particular values to be developed. The history teachers´ assignments can therefore be in conflict. In the article I analyze the Swedish history teachers´ mission by comparing the goals for the citizenship education in the curriculum´s first chapter, with the theoretical construction of how to develop the students´ historical consciousness, found in the syllabus in history. At the end there is a discussion and a tentative suggestion how to process the tension between making democrats and at the same time develop the students´ cognitive abilities to understand and use history of their own.

KEYWORDS: curriculum, historical consciousness, citizenship education, history teaching.

Introduction

In this article I carry out a philosophical and theoretical discussion. The discussion centers around the expectations on the subject of history in Sweden to shape democratic citizens embracing certain values, and the expectations to, at the same time, develop the students´ historical consciousness in an individual, analytical and highly cognitive way. I will argue that this complex mission can carry methodological contradictions for the history teacher. In the first chapter, "Fundamental values and tasks of the school", in the curriculum for the compulsory school in Sweden, a cross-curricular claim is stated: the education is supposed to shape citizens embracing certain values emanating from a specific culture**,** in the curriculum defined as **"**Christian tradition and Western humanism" (Skolverket 2011, p. 9). On the other hand, the history syllabus in the same curriculum aims at an education fostering students to use history to make their own individual standpoints in important and for the society vivid questions. Teaching history to internalize certain values calls for a method where history strengthens the values in question, while history teaching, where the students use history to make up their own minds, calls for a method where the students at first hand learn to interpret history and build their own historical accounts or narratives. The students own interpretations of history can, however, contradict certain values in the curriculum.

History and use of history is not a neutral science, it has political and ethical dimensions. This means that history and historical mediation also are included in political and ethical projects, such as nation building, or to criticize the contemporary society (Gaddis, 2002). History as a subject is therefore a vivid democratic tool that either can strengthen or challenge the contemporary society. The message you want to bring via history, determines your selection

of historical facts as you build your historical accounts or narratives (Ricoeur, 1984, 1985, 1988; White 1973, 1978, 1987). Historical narrative in itself is therefore not democratic. Historical facts and sources must consequently be used carefully when constructing historical narratives if it is supposed to strengthen democratic values and democratic abilities. On the other hand, a historical teaching method that tells the students an already interpreted history, does not include the citizens into the democratic process to actually form the contemporary and future society via use of history. Such students are rather fostered to preserve the contemporary society.

If we want the students to be able to use history by themselves, making their own historical interpretations and narratives, we also must understand that their use of history will contain moral and political issues. That´s the nature of the historical narrative (Ricoeur, 1984, 1985, 1988; White, 1973, 1978, 1987). The students´ historical interpretations can therefore either be congruent or not, to the values every student is supposed to embrace according to the curriculum´s first chapter. The other alternative is a history teacher telling a grand narrative, which contains and highlights what s/he wants the students to learn from history, history as *historia magistra vitae*. The disadvantage in this case is that the students do not practice using and understanding history themselves to orient in the society, and will become easy targets for propagandistic uses of history.

First I will analyze the relationship between the different cross curricular requirements that are supposed to foster democrats, found in the curriculum for the compulsory school. To assist me in this analysis I create a table based on three different assumptions of what the base of a democracy can be. I then place the cross curricular requirements in this model. After this I analyze the relationship between the cross curricular requirements and the historical abilities the history syllabus describes as abilities for the students to develop. From this analysis I reason that the history teacher has to choose from three different starting points for their history teaching if they want to meet the demands from the curriculum as it is constructed today. At the end, I will point out a hypothesis of how to face the contradiction between telling the students what to think and at the same time letting them interpret history on their own.

The Swedish curriculum and the cross-curricular citizenship education

In its broadest definition, citizenship education embraces all the processes that affect people's beliefs, commitments, capabilities, and actions as members or prospective members of communities. Used in the school it involves a normative vision, and refers to educate the students to become good citizens (Kjellin & Stier, 2008). The Swedish curriculum for the compulsory school first of all states that:

> The national school system is based on democratic foundations. The Education Act (2010:800) stipulates that education in the school system aims at pupils acquiring and developing knowledge and values.
>
> […]
>
> Education should impart and establish respect for human rights and the fundamental democratic values on which Swedish society is based (Skolverket, 2011, n.p.).

Ideas of what constitutes a democracy are however many, and different democracies stress different ideas. The American Declaration of Independence, despite the fact that women and slaves didn´t have the right to vote, still clearly, as a document so to speak, illustrates the most vital ideas about a democracy in a western context. Those are: a) the idea that we all are born equal, b) the idea that democracy must guarantee some human rights and c) the idea that democracy is a system to make political decisions:

> We hold these truths to be self-evident, that all men are <u>created equal</u>, that they are endowed by their Creator with <u>certain unalienable Rights</u>, that among these are Life, Liberty and the pursuit of Happiness. That to secure these rights, Governments are instituted among Men, deriving their just <u>powers from the consent of the governed.</u>

These democratic ideas also correspond to ideas about how a citizen should embrace them: a) to be democratic, b) to use democracy and c) to know democracy.

The normative approach to democracy, democracy as values, is democracy as a way of life, to be democratic, that is. Normative democracy is based on the idea that citizens in a democracy are *"created equal"*. My rights, to use democracy, must end where another´s equality is challenged. Therefore, in a normative democracy, there is a continuous discussion about where to draw the boundaries between rights and equality. There are after all certain intrinsic values in a democracy, and to embrace them is to be democratic. But which values are we speaking about and how are they supposed to be interpreted? One way has been to base the democracy on civil rights, but since the 1980´s, frequent criticism of democratic communities based on individual rights has come from the school of communitarianism. One of the most read philosophers from this school, Michael Sandel, advocates a democracy in which citizens are united in the pursuit of a common good. Consequently, values are dependent on the definition of the good; for example, Sandel claims that the right to free speech is conditional, and that there are no good reasons to tolerate speech that is harmful to society (Sandel, 1998). The opening chapter on Fundamental Values in the Swedish curriculum for the compulsory school clearly indicates that the school should convey common cultural values:

> The school has the important task of imparting, instilling and forming in pupils those fundamental values on which our society is based.

> In accordance with the ethics borne by Christian tradition and Western humanism, this is achieved by fostering in the individual a sense of justice, generosity of spirit, tolerance and responsibility (Skolverket, 2011, n.p.).

The fact that these "fundamental values" should be interpreted from *"the ethics borne by Christian tradition and Western humanism"*, makes it clear that the values to be learned in the school are culturally conditioned. This makes the core values in the curriculum irrevocably culturally normative, and not based on human rights. To understand what for example gender equality, something the students are supposed to appreciate, means in this context, it must be interpreted as the culture formed by the Christian tradition and Western humanism in Sweden does it. Moreover, to foster students to embrace a society's "fundamental values" is a much more extensive mission than to foster them to, for example, comply with democratic rules and laws.

The basic ideas for the democratic rights, on the other hand, addresses an ability to be able to use democracy. These ideas originated in the Enlightenment and were supported by liberalists as John Locke and John Stuart Mill. The autonomous individual with the capacity to critically reflect on different matters and make up his own mind is central to this idea (Rosenqvist, 2011). Jürgen Habermas' model of a deliberative democracy in which people are free to interact in the public sphere also is an idea one can place here. In this case the democracy survives through a vital democratic dialogue, without requirements on values, more than the ones that ensures a democratic and equal discussion (Habermas, 1998, 2000). The idea about how to use democracy certainly also have support in the curriculum's first chapter stating that:

> The task of the school is to encourage all pupils to discover their own uniqueness as individuals and thereby be able to participate in the life of society by giving of their best in responsible freedom. (Skolverket, 2011)

> The school is responsible for ensuring that each pupil on completing compulsory school can make use of critical thinking and independently formulate standpoints based on knowledge and ethical considerations. (Skolverket, 2011)

In this perspective, to be democratic in the Swedish school, must mean not only to be able to use your democratic rights as freedom to speech but actually to use it to proclaim reflected individual standpoints.

When it comes to active participation, the students are supposed to know democracy and how it functions, for example that many institutions in a democracy have "their powers from the consent of the governed". In the Western world, most people agree that democracy, at its core, is a form of state organization, a political method. A democratic society can, therefore, be understood primarily as a way of governing a country: a functionalist democracy. A functionalist democracy, as the starting point of a democratic vision, will lead to a focus on different forms of government and the way in which political decisions should be taken and orchestrated, this part is mostly a part of the subject of social studies.

The mission to make good citizens in the Swedish school rests on a paradox: to shape unique persons, well informed, with individual opinions but with the same values; the atomistic individual with certain rights in contrast to a universalistic idea about common democratic values. Will the school uppermost foster citizens that embrace certain values, or will it first of all foster citizens who themselves reflect upon society and from their reflections construct their own stand points and values? Table one reveals the paradox between the requirements in the first chapter in the curriculum.

Table 1. Different Democratic foundations to the left, quotes from the Declaration of Independence congruent with the different democratic foundations in the middle and requirements congruent with the different democratic foundations from the chapter "Fundamental values" in the Swedish curriculum to the right. Possible tensions between the school´s mission is most easily found in the right column and between row two and three, to be democratic and to use democracy

Different democratic foundations	Quotes from the Declaration of Independence	Quotes about values and competencies from the curriculum´s chapter *Fundamental Values*
To be democratic	*... all men are created equal*	• The school has the important task of imparting, instilling and forming in pupils those fundamental values on which our society is based. • In accordance with the ethics borne by Christian tradition and Western humanism, this is achieved by fostering in the individual a sense of justice, generosity of spirit, tolerance and responsibility. • No one should be subjective to discrimination at school. • The inviolability of human life, individual freedom and integrity, the equal value of all people, equality between women and men and solidarity with the weak and vulnerable are all values that the school should represent and impart • Students should appreciate the values that are to be found in cultural diversity

To use democracy	*... that they are endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable Rights*	• Every student should discover their own uniqueness as individuals. • The students should be able to form personal standpoints. • Education should be objective and encompass a range of different approaches.
To know democracy	*Governments are instituted among Men, deriving their just powers from the consent of the governed*	• The students shall learn to actively participate in social life

What category of the three, to be democratic, to use democracy or to know democracy, the history teacher chooses to start from when implementing the cross-curricular values from the chapter "Fundamental Values" also must shape the interpretation of how to develop the students´ historical consciousness.

## Historical Consciousness as something to develop in the school

The definition of historical consciousness in the history didactic discourse is in one way similar in a German, Scandinavian, British and Canadian context. In all these countries the history didactics that use the concept mean that it covers three time dimensions: the past, the present and the future (Jensen, 1997; Rüsen, 2004a; Karlsson, 2011; Lee & Howson, 2009; Shemilt, 2009; Seixas, 2004). With this starting point the concept of historical consciousness attempts to capture the mental and deeply human process whereby humans, by building on perceptions of the past, imagine the future to be able to act in the present.

   Using this concept as a point of departure for the teaching of history means that the focus for history education has shifted. In Sweden along with a new curriculum from 1994. The focus is no longer about what once has happened as a way to understand the present. The ambition has become even larger; the teaching of history should prepare students for the future and enhance an understanding that different actions have different implications for the future, and that the possible actions to make are dependent on history. The concept of historical consciousness also contains processes of creating meaning for both the individual and the collective; the way we look at the past affects our perception of the present and what we think needs to be done for the future. The reverse is also true; the present affects the way we look at the past. To develop the students´ historical consciousness is to influence their future opinions and acts. In that way it´s highly normative and political. Therefore, if we truly believe in this concept, it clearly must be taken into consideration as we build our teaching around the citizenship education, while in this way history is not only a field of knowledge, but also a force that influences the way in which we choose to live our lives and what future society we are striving for (Alvén, 2011).

According to the Swedish history syllabus from 2011 the students study history to develop their historical consciousness. In the syllabus the historical consciousness is defined as a process that announces that "Man's understanding of the past is interwoven with beliefs about the present and perspectives of the future". It is also stated that our historical consciousness affects our choices for the future and that it is constructed on historical narratives. To develop the students´ historical consciousness the education centers around four abilities, namely the students´ ability to: a) use a historical frame of reference, b) critically examine, interpret and evaluate sources, c) reflect over their own and other's use of history, and d) use historical concepts to analyze how historical knowledge is organized, created and used (Skolverket, 2011). Those abilities are then described through a core content, "the historical frame of reference", and knowledge requirements to be used for assessment. Reading the syllabus in history the four abilities to be developed most be interpreted as highly cognitive abilities. The historical frame of reference as something to learn, and the other three as abilities to help the students to interpret history or to analyze use of history. Since the syllabus says nothing about what sort of acts or values the students are supposed to do or embrace after meeting the history teaching in the school you must, as a teacher, turn to the chapter "Fundamental Values" in the curriculum to understand this. The chapter "Fundamental Values" in the curriculum is also supposed to be perceived as a cross-curricular theme (Sandström & Stier, 2008), and together with the syllabus in history the history education thereby both contains cognitive and normative goals.

If you consider the whole curriculum, both the chapter about fundamental values and the syllabus in history, the idea must be that both cognitive abilities and certain values should build the students´ historical consciousness. Figure 1 shows this.

Figure 1.

The teacher assignment to shape desirable historical consciousness´ is thus manifold. A methodology that shapes a historical consciousness characterized by analytical historical thinking is not obviously embedding certain values into the students, and a methodology that will lead to certain values not primarily, have to teach analytical historical thinking skills (Lee, 2012; Lee & Shemilt, 2007).

The construction with a history syllabus aiming at developing the students´ cognitive historical consciousness but without any ideas of what this historical consciousness is supposed to generate in the future, and a general citizenship proclamation containing certain values to be internalized into the students, leaves the history teacher to three different ways of teaching: a) just teaching neutral historical facts, b) teaching facts and abilities and then letting the students make their own historical interpretations and narratives which inevitably will contain moral and political issues, and c) teaching ready-made narratives in congruence with the schools´ values. None of these teaching methods, however, in a natural way include the others, and this may shape tensions between them if the history teacher tries to meet them all.

Three Different Ways That History Education Can Meet the Mission to Develop Democratic Citizens Text

As early as the late nineteenth century, the German philosopher Nietzsche wrote that history mainly exists in the service of life and, therefore, has different purposes. With the concepts antiquarian, critical, and monumental history, he demonstrated different ways people relate to history. These different uses of history broadly correspond to the categories of the various divisions of the democratic starting points that can be found in table one*:* to know democracy, to use democracy, and to be democratic. Not as content but as methodology his categories also correspond to the three different uses of history the history teacher can choose from when fostering democratic citizens: teaching neutral historical facts, teaching historical abilities and letting the students make their own historical interpretations, and narratives which inevitably also will contain moral issues, and, at last, teaching ready-made narratives in congruence with the school´s values.

Depending on which way of the three the history teacher decides to relate to history and democracy, he also needs to make choices on what history or histories to tell and what abilities to teach in the history classroom. I will now outline three ideal types of history teaching based on the three democratic starting points in the background, and Nietzsches´ different uses of history. Of course, these ideal types do not exist in pure forms in the history classroom, but can serve as analytical tools when discussing the task of developing the students´ historical consciousness in accordance with certain ideas of civic education. The three ideal types are: to know democracy – to learn historical facts; to use democracy – to learn historical abilities; and, to be democratic – to internalize certain values.

To know Democracy – To learn historical facts

Nietzsche´s antiquarian use of history is characterized by a passion for everything old. This use of history helps our memory to cherish our heritage and gives us a sense of security, and the more you know about the past the better (Nietzsche, 1998). In 2007, Peter Lee and Dennis Shemilt co-wrote an article in *Teaching History* about various approaches to teaching history. They described three teaching models for teaching history. Their model also reminds of Nietzsche´s different uses of history, and if you teach "history as cornucopia" you go on with business as usual. The hope is that the more students know about what has happened, the wiser they will become. The danger is that history as a subject becomes needless. There is no point to learn history as a particular way of thinking when it is all about memorizing. I am not sure that this type of history teaching actually exists, since somebody always has to make a selection of historical facts to know. This decision inevitably contains perceptions of what it is valuable to know about the past. Therefore, I am sceptical to the existence of an objective and neutral factual history teaching. If the teacher decides what to teach his or her identity makes the

selection from the past and if the students decide the content their identities decide where to enter the past and what to bring back to the contemporary.

In this article, I assume that history teaching and citizenship education must be understood as a simultaneous task. If so, Nietzsche's antiquarian history, and Shemilts´ and Lee´s cornucopian use of history is closest to an exit point where it is all about to make the students effective citizens through factual knowledge about the past. The history teacher could then teach about different types of democracies through history, how they evolved and how they functioned. A history teaching approach to meet the citizenship category of "To Know Democracy" would be to tell facts about different democratic communities, and about communities that has failed to be democratic. But there would be no distinct moral or plot in the narratives, nothing to build up a narrative historical consciousness around, a historical consciousness that acts in the future in accordance with the fundamental values in the curriculum. History teaching would be a journey through time to visit fragmented transit halls of democracy without a cohesive notion. The risk that the historical content would be simplified would be overwhelming. The aim for the history education would be students who know a lot about democratic institutions. Students who know how to act through the democratic institutions, and to recognize communities that are not democratic. It would explain the democratic societies today but have no aspiration to affect the students´ activities or values in the future. Therefore, in this type of history teaching, there is no vision about the democratic society, more than active democrats knowing how to recognise and use the democratic institutions in a mechanical way. Would it take history teaching to learn the students this content? Could such a teaching claim to develop the students´ historical consciousness? Probably not. Could this rather be managed through citizenship education alone? Probably. Anyway, a history teaching such as this, with the key point in the past, would have no aspiration to develop the students´ historical consciousness, and therefore, as shown in figure one, it stops in the perceptions of the past, the historical frame of reference, and doesn´t make it through the dotted line into the contemporary and the future.

To use democracy: To learn historical abilities

As Nietzsche talks about a critical use of history he means using history in life to question whether what has happened in the past was morally good or not. It is aimed at people who are in need of liberation in the present, and who use history to challenge the contemporary ideas in society and to try to shape a future society they want (Nietzsche, 1998). Close to this approach Lee and Shemilt write about "History as complement". This is a way of using history in the classroom in which democratic rights as freedom of opinion and speech are applied, and in which students make their own knowledge about human kind while using the past. In this case, the history teaching provides the tools to understand and use the past. Knowing history becomes more a form of knowledge of *"how to",* instead of *"what to know"*. Lee and Shemilt write:

> We should strive to equip students with the knowledge, conceptual and logical apparatus necessary to ensure that their decisions as citizens will be less stupid than might otherwise have been the case, but we can do no more than hope their actions will also be less cruel. To expect more would be to confuse a complementary relationship with a collaborationist one (Lee & Shemilt, 2007, p. 14).

Here Lee and Shemilt point out the difficulty in teaching a historical knowledge that develops historical abilities, which also implement specific values. If we want students who can "form personal standpoints" (Skolverket, 2011) by the use of history we should teach them history as a way of knowing. This would mean to prepare them to use their democratic rights. To be judged as skilled in the subject of history is then not about showing the right values, or to know

a lot of history in the first hand, but more about to demonstrate analytical and reflective thinking while using history (Alvén, 2011).

This line of inquiry of the students´ historical consciousness focus on the individuals´ process of developing historical thinking abilities, and follows the upper line in figure one. When developing the students' thinking ability the mission to shape society in the future is handed over to the prospective citizens.

Research in this field studies how students learn cognitive operations that develop their historical thinking or understanding (Dickinson, Gordon, & Lee, 2001; Dickinson, Lee, & Rogers, 1984; Leinhardt, Beck, & Stainton, 1994; Stearns, Seixas, & Wineburg, 2000; Voss & Carretero, 1998; Wineburg, 2001). Some of the researchers have even made typologies describing a more or less developed historical thinking for the students (Shemilt, 2000; Lee & Ashby, 2000) or even a more or less developed historical consciousness (Rüsen, 2004a). But this research doesn´t consider what values the students develop. Rüsen of course has moral aspects in his typology for different types of historical consciousness, but he doesn´t show how and why students capture some values and not others, while using and thinking history.

Although historical skills or cognitive thinking play an important role for history learning, emotions and moral thinking also often play an incredibly important role in the process of learning and understanding history (Carr, 1962; Dray, 1967; Gaddis, 2002; Low-Beer, 1967). Focusing on just rational explanations and historical skills would ignore this impact on the students. A history education like that would leave the students alone with feelings of euphoria, hate, fear, pain or trauma, strong feelings that can hinder them from telling narratives about the past to construct their identities in a positive way and narratives that give meaning to the past (Ricoeur, 1988). Traditionally history is taught via ready-made narratives, with clear values and explanations, that helps the students to give the past a meaning. But when advocating this we are in another category of teaching history, "to be democratic."

To be democratic: To internalize values through historical narratives

According to Nietzsche the monumental use of history is selective and retrieves inspiration and ideological explanation via great deeds and heroes of the past. This use of history is addressed to the industrious and active man. Those who use monumental history want to influence and guide the development in a certain and well-known direction (Nietzsche, 1998). Lee and Shemilt let us know that teaching "history as a carrier" means that the students must meet history to take a stand against evil and for the common good (Lee & Shemilt, 2007*)*. I have chosen to refer to a teaching addressed to an affective historical consciousness via historical narratives; this teaching challenges the students' historical consciousness, not intellectually, but morally and affective (Alvén, 2011). If the students' values are conforming to the school´s fundamental values, the affective historical consciousness is affirmed. If the students' values are not conforming to the school´s fundamental values, their historical consciousness should be provoked, and hopefully changed. In this teaching model, the past is used to provide examples of good and bad societies, actions and persons in history and is symbolized by the lower line in figure one. The good society, interpreted through the curriculums´ first chapter, must then be a society built on fundamental values "in accordance with the ethics borne by Christian tradition and Western humanism" (Skolverket, 2011). This teaching looks for assimilation into an existing society and a similar identity among the students. The vision would be a history mono-cultural in consensus. The method would be to tell a Grand Narrative with successes and failures to the utopia, a reference book of right and wrong ways to live and organize social human life. The history teacher would for example have to tell narratives about the good Athens and the bad Spartans, the bad Crusades but the good end of serfdom, the good Enlightenment but the

bad Napoleon wars, the bad capitalisms´ exploitation of the working class but the good democratic breakthrough, the bad catastrophic wars in the twentieth century but the good quest for peace through UN and EU.

This way of teaching history and to develop the students´ historical consciousness is more of a political ambition than a thinking skill. The directives from the power of will as Jörn Rüsen puts it (Rüsen, 2004b). Traditionally the history education has aimed for certain values and was formed around nationality and building a national identity among the students (López & Carretero, 2012). Today we also find this way of teaching history as ready-made narratives or interpretations but intended to promote aspects that are linked to a contemporary democratic citizenship (Barton & Levstik, 2008; Janowitz, 1983; Von Heyking, 2006). Barton and Levstik writes:

> …our judgements are grounded in assumptions about the contribution of history to democratic society rather than in mimicry of academic discourse. Rather than claiming that this perspective is a timeless and universal one,
>
> […]
>
> … we acknowledge that it derives from a particular vision of what history education might become in our own society and in our time (2004, pp. 5-6).

In their book, *Teaching History For The Common Good*, Barton and Levstik (2004) argues for a multi-perspective and critical history teaching. But at the same time they have a clear idea of which history education trends have gone wrong, namely the national one emanating from the majority people, and which one that now must be included, the historical perspectives from the minority groups, that is (Barton & Levstik, 2004). Having a clear vision from the start of what perspectives good and bad use of history includes, places them, despite their elaborated and sympathetic ideas of a critical history education, in a category of history teaching emanating from the contemporary society´s values and with a clear vision of the good society.

The idea to shape a citizenship identity is based on ideas such as the future citizen´s participation in the society and is centered on democratic values and participation in a contemporary society. The goal in this tradition is to foster values, patriotic or values in line with a cosmopolitan democratic citizenship. In both cases the teaching of history is more important as a way to build a desired identity than to develop historical abilities among the students (López & Carretero, 2012). Studies in this tradition emphasize the narrative structure of history and the connection between the perception of the history and the construction of identities in the present (Barton & Levstik, 1998, 2004; Hammack, 2010; Wertsch, 1997).

The Grand Narrative in the schoolbooks would in a Swedish context and in line with this way of teaching history probably be about the creation of a new equal democratic society grown from a multitude of culturally disparate peoples, a triumph of Enlightenment rationalism and humanism but also a retelling of a biblical people in diaspora, looking for a united and modern life in Sweden, all "In accordance with the ethics borne by Christian tradition and Western humanism", as the curriculum puts it (Skolverket, 2011). Historical periods would then be deemed relevant or irrelevant compared to the values they are intended to reinforce, and the moral key point would be the contemporary Sweden. Such a selection is dangerous as the students can´t be permitted to draw wrong conclusions from the historical material they meet. The high risk imbedded in the historical selection forces the teachers to prescribe interpretations. To be persuasive the historical events are often abstracted from their broader temporal and geographical context, thereby the students are not allowed to search for their own truth. Wertsch has also shown that a history education that teaches beliefs risks leading to the reverse, examining students that incorporate counter-narratives (Wertsch, 2000). Lee and Shemilt also warn for this teaching model while students can think that history is not about to learn from human experience through time, but to affirm our own time (Lee & Shemilt, 2007).

In figure 1 the focus in this way of teaching history is therefore mainly on the contemporary. A contemporary that are argued for and protected into the future.

Table 2. Different democratic starting points and history teaching models to foster democratic citizens in Sweden lead to different sorts of teaching strategies, historical content, temporal key points and visions for the future.

Democratic starting point	History Teaching Model	Teaching strategy	Historical content	Temporal Key Point	Future Vision
To know democracy	To learn historical facts.	Repeat and memorize historical facts.	A fragmented journey via time and factual knowledge.	The past.	Citizens that know a lot of history.
To use democracy	To learn historical abilities.	Students learn historical methods. Students learn to handle sources. Students learn to handle historical concepts. Students learn to construct own narratives.	The students´ own understanding of history	The future.	A pluralistic history culture with conflicts and ongoing discussions between reflecting individuals. The citizens are in charge for the future society.
To be democratic	To internalize values through historical narratives.	Teacher telling stories. Students reading text books. Movies and historical books containing the right values.	The Great Narrative of Good and Bad things in history.	The Contemporary.	A mono history culture in consensus built on a Christian and Western humanistic identity among the citizens. The political power is in charge for the future society.

To learn from the help of history

After analysing the curriculum from both a citizenship and a history teaching perspective I would say that the subject of history supposed to both develop the students´ historical consciousness and at the same time make citizens embracing certain democratic values, must

search its identity from all the three perspectives: "to learn historical facts", "to learn historical methods" and "to internalize certain values", if it is supposed to be a vivid and an important subject to the society. This strategy should not, however, mean a teaching model that sometimes starts in one category and other times in another. This would puzzle the students as their private historical consciousness probably not are so harmonious to the teachers´ volatile intentions, moving from one category to another. The historical consciousness is a slow-moving process (Alvén, 2011). If you are supposed to develop it among the students you must not only be persistent, but also consistent. This means we must choose one of the categories as a starting point, but that we also can involve the other two teaching categories. One of the three categories are not at all, interested in how the students will act in the future, "to learn historical facts", that is. Of course we impact the students´ perceptions of the past if we teach them facts about it, but we leave this input, to the process of the historical consciousness itself. We don´t know what it will bring. On the other hand the students must meet some kind of remains from the past to be able to think history at all. That selection is, however, dependent on which of the other two categories you choose to start from. The two categories left, "to internalize values" and "to learn historical methods", are the ones left if our intention is to develop the students´ historical consciousness acting in a certain way in the future. Yet, a history education that internalizes certain values has assisted several dictators through history, and has also forced some students to dissociate from the school´s history education, mostly minorities have felt excluded. History teaching must, therefore, in a pluralistic democracy, take its starting point in students themselves using history when navigating in the contemporary, otherwise we can´t speak of a pluralistic society, neither of a pluralistic history teaching that guarantees the democratic rights for all the students. A history teaching supposed to develop the students´ historical consciousness to help them orientate in the society must start with an understanding that there are different narratives about certain historical events, otherwise it would be pointless to teach the students to "form personal standpoints" with the help of history knowledge, or to perform an education that encompasses a "range of different approaches" to empower different historical perspectives, or to foster the students to be "tolerant", all requirements in the curriculum (Skolverket, 2011). This approach must lead to a teaching that takes into account a complex and vivid history culture. Those different narratives can indeed challenge the majority´s way of understanding history, and its´ certain values, and in that way also challenge the values the school is to implement into the students.

This requires students who are able to think about where different decisions in the past led and what consequences those decisions had. For the students to be able to think freely and not be controlled by certain fundamental values, teaching cannot be dictatorial in instilling certain ideas or values into the students since this prevents the development of the free mind. The historical frame of reference learned in school, must therefore be, as long as possible, free from moral preaching and moral exhortations. Telling readymade narratives must be done with moral caution. But is one historical narrative as good as another? Can we completely relativize history, in our effort to allow the students to use history themselves and because we are afraid to offend them? Of course not.

If teaching truly is focused on developing thinking skills, education could be based on teleological ethics. Such an ethics enables construction and deconstruction of a history culture and its narratives. In that way the future constitutes the foundation for the values in the historical consciousness as well. The students are not neutral to history as they come to school. Their narrative templates are formed in different history cultures, and if the school does not challenge those templates they will use their skills trained in the school to strengthen their personal, but contextual and moral, narratives and the school has no impact on their identities more than that they can argue for their opinions on a higher level. On the other hand, there is, however, limits to what the Swedish democratic discussion can withstand, and the school can´t abandon the

citizenship education on this point. But maybe instead of oppressing some narratives, as in the category "To internalize values through historical narratives", the students´ narratives can always be challenged by counter narratives, and supplementary questions. An education in which different historical narratives would be grappled with would be an education that allows different ideas, but at the same time be tough on ideas that do not measure up to certain standards of thinking. This would be similar to a deliberative democracy, in which the most potent ideas live on, with the major advantage that different opinions are allowed if they have a certain quality. This would mean an education that promotes inclusion, one in which students from different history cultures must come together to explain their views on how the world works and which direction they can choose together with their classmates. This would be integration in its full sense, where different history narratives together shape the future (Alvén, 2011). The students' use of history must then meet criteria for the facts and methods they use when building their narratives, but also ethical criteria. Have they thought about what consequences their use of history can lead to? I believe that history in large parts can be told with different perspectives, and an ethical criterion for choosing among those would be natural. Why choose perspectives that brings unhappiness and misery? Such an ethical criterion for a historical narrative could also be helpful when analysing others´ use of history in the contemporary society.

I believe that the encounter with persons who carries other narratives in a conversation also can enable you to reinterpret your own stories. If you are willing to listen to and understand others, it may mean not only that you want to offer your own view of reality, but also that you may need to reinterpret your own narrative templates. According to Rüsen, this cultivation could be possible in all pluralistic classrooms, while, as an analytical tool, it is feasible to carve up the narrations and compare them to each other (Rüsen, 2004a). I understand this to mean that the historical narratives should not be perceived as the persons´ own properties, instead, the narratives meet in an arena where some of them are more credible than others. This would allow different narratives to negotiate and compromise in the classroom.

Influenced by Rüsen I can see three criteria to judge the students' historical narratives as their historical and moral consciousness meet and seek compromise in the classroom. Each criterion corresponds to one of the teaching models earlier presented but are to be used at the same time:

- The historical facts criteria – Is the students´ narrative true to the historical facts, as we know them?

- The historical methods criteria – Is narrative true to the historical methods, as we know them? Is the plot in the narrative reasonable and coherently?

- The value criteria –Are there sustainable ethical arguments in the narrative? Has the student seen possible consequences with his or her narrative? What future acts does the narrative invite?

Based on these criteria, history teaching could be a communicative model in the school. If we want history to tell us how to act in society, we not only have to clarify our own relation to the past, but we also have to do so with that of others. For this to take place, we have to tell our narratives to each other and to integrate them with each other. This is not about imposing one narrative or one kind of values onto others, on the contrary, the narratives that will be listened to offer explanations that meet the criteria of facts, methods and values. This would be a teaching of history in which students with different narratives could meet and find each other. The students would then have to learn not only to create common good and sustainable narratives but also to act as critical recipients of historical narratives. Such a teaching of history would not only show respect to all students but also clearly help a pluralistic society to find the

most vital historical narratives, in plural that is, among the many that exist. The goal for the history teaching would not only be a sustainable citizenship but also history didactical, as the students must use history as they debate in the classroom to draw reflective lessons about themselves, others and the society they want to live in.

To be able to affect the students´ historical consciousness the history teaching must ask for the students´ own historical narratives, and dare to meet them in an honest and fair dialogue. The history teacher has the tools in the history syllabus to handle this type of dialogue when it comes to measure up to criteria about historical facts and historical methods but stands alone when it comes to the value criteria. Here the fundamental values described in the curriculum´s first chapter could help, but unfortunately they are too widespread, too anxious and too culturally and contextually bound to be a good working tool for the history teachers, who now must rely on their own decision making in selecting which narratives that measure up to the value criteria and those that do not. It can lead to some narratives being excluded on unclear premises. That, if anything, can create violent counter narratives.

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Analysing adolescents' reasoning about historical responsibility in dialogue between history education and social psychology

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ABSTRACT: Historical and moral consciousness have been studied by specialists in history education and social psychology, respectively, yet the two fields of study have remained separate also when they share an interest in the dynamics of how people respond to moral dilemmas, process them and create morally meaningful narratives of human conduct. This article seeks to identify concepts and interpretative frames that could be mobilised in analyses of shared material for the purpose of developing deeper understanding of the intersections of historical and moral consciousness in exchange between history education and social psychology. One of the authors has researched moral reasoning and moral sensitivity, the other has researched adolescents' historical consciousness. The empirical material was collected in 2008–2009, in a study of how Finnish upper secondary school students reason about transgenerational responsibility and reparation. How the students process and negotiate these issues was initially analysed as a manifestation of their historical consciousness. This article explores what approaches and concepts could be relevant when analysing the material in the framework of a social-psychological study of morality. The article is also an exercise in co-authoring where the authors have produced the text in dialogic exchange, writing one chapter each in turn and responding to each other's ideas.

KEYWORDS: historical consciousness, moral consciousness, moral psychology, history education, moral education, focus groups.

Introduction

Historical consciousness and moral consciousness (the latter concept pertaining here to the complex of elements relating to moral sensitivity; see also Introduction to the special issue) have been extensively theorised and empirically studied by specialists of history education and social psychology, respectively. Yet the two fields of study remain largely alien to each other, despite a coinciding interest in questions of how people process moral dilemmas and create morally meaningful narratives of human conduct. This article seeks to identify concepts and interpretative frames in the study of historical and moral consciousness that can be mobilised and fruitfully married in future analyses of shared empirical material for the purpose of developing a deeper understanding of the intersections between historical and moral consciousness. It can be read as an exercise in multidisciplinary study, however one can argue that constructing bridges between historical and moral consciousness should preferably go deeper into the crossdisciplinary or interdisciplinary level so as to better grasp the complexity of the topic. However, we hope this article will serve as a step along the path, showing openings and hesitations that come up in exchanges between two disciplines.

Jan Löfström has researched adolescents' historical consciousness and Liisa Myyry has done social-psychological research on moral judgment, moral sensitivity and moral motivation. The material discussed in the article was collected by Jan Löfström in 2008–2009,

in a focus group study of how Finnish upper secondary school students reason about issues of transgenerational responsibility and historical reparations. How the students processed and negotiated these issues was seen as manifestations of their historical consciousness. This article explores what approaches and concepts could be relevant and rewarding when analysing the focus group material in the framework of a social-psychological study of morality, bringing a fresh view on the project that was initially hinged upon other conceptual premises.

The article is a co-authoring exercise where the contributions from the authors are in dialogic exchange. At first Jan Löfström describes the aims and the outcomes of his study. Liisa Myyry then discusses, from the perspective of social psychology, what conceptual approaches could be relevant and fruitful in analysing these focus groups. In the following chapter Löfström ponders upon these suggestions and the questions they raise, and in chapter four Myyry responds to those reflections. The final words present some concluding remarks on how the focus group might have been modified in the direction of integrating the study of historical and moral consciousness more closely.

Starting point: studying adolescents' moral consciousness via their reasoning on historical responsibility

The research project on Finnish adolescents' reflections on historical responsibility and historical reparation, launched, in 2008, was propelled by the observation that issues of transgenerational responsibility and reparation were prominent in the global scale but there was next to no research on how people reason about transgenerational responsibility and see the meanings of historical reparation. Reconcilliating historical conflicts through history education has now become a topic of numerous educational initiatives (e.g. Han et al. (eds), 2012; Korostelina & Lässig (eds), 2013), the political, philosophical and judicial dimensions of historical reparations have been extensively studied (e.g. Barkan 2001; Elster 2004; Freeman et al. 2006; Nobles 2008; Thompson 2002; Torpey 2006; Wiebelhaus-Brahm 2009; Gibney et al. (eds) 2008), yet people's reflections on the rationale and justification of historical reparations still remain very much unexplored as they did also ten years ago.

Questions relating to the treatment of historical injustices are, for example, who if any was accountable for the unjust actions in the past, who has a moral right to speak on behalf of the perpetrators and the victims of past injustices now, and can people of a distant past be judged by today's moral standards, and on what premises? As people discuss these questions they express what kind of narratives of historical change and continuity they are predisposed to construct. For example, do people readily think of the past, the present and the future as connected by continuities or rather that they are separated by discontinuities? In the first alternative they may more willingly say that there is transgenerational moral responsibility, for example.

Perceptions of continuity and discontinuity lie at the heart of historical consciousness, a basic human disposition that one's interpretations of the past, expectations about the future and perceptions of the present inform and feed into each other (see, for example, Seixas (ed.), 2004.) It has also been suggested, notably by Jörn Rüsen (2004), that historical consciousness is a kind of narrative competence, ability to generate interpretations of the world where there are meaningful interrelations between the past, the present and the future. Rüsen's theory of various types of narratives implies some differentiation between more and less developed narratives but it does not give an explicit hierarchy of the types. Historical consciousness has been theorised by a number of scholars but Jörn Rüsen can be pointed out as a theorist with explicit interest in the moral element of historical consciousness. He has argued that in the

narratives of historical change and continuity that people generate there is a moral dimension involved in that these narratives are stories about right and wrong. In other words people are predisposed to give history moral meanings. (See Rüsen, 2005; Ammert 2015.) In that respect moral consciousness is inextricably intertwined with historical consciousness.

In moral psychology moral consciousness, or moral sensitivity, could be defined as an awareness of how our actions affect other people immediately and in long-term (Rest, 1986). Moral sensitivity requires the ability to take the other's viewpoint, and cognition and affect are interconnected in moral sensitivity in role-taking and feeling the so called moral emotions, such as empathy, guilt and shame. Although through decades cognition was the main focus of moral research, in recent years the focus has shifted more and more to the role of emotions in moral consciousness and behavior (Hoffman, 2000; Lickel et al., 2005; Silfver-Kuhalampi, 2009). It seems that the emotional part of morality also help us to interpret the moral meanings people give to historical narratives.

Research on adolescent historical consciousness can contribute to the development of history teaching if it helps teachers and teacher educators to understand how students connect the 'layers' of time and situate themselves in the fabric of temporal relations. A deeper knowledge of this may help teachers to better design history classes so that students experience the study of history as relevant and rewarding to their lives. This was also the rationale of the study of Finnish adolescents' historical consciousness as it started.

The Finnish research project was based on focus group interviews of fifty-three 17–18-year old upper secondary school students (28 boys, 25 girls). In every group there were three to four interviewees, recruited on a voluntary basis. The focus groups took place in eight different schools in Southern and Central Finland. The justification for using focus groups was to get a view of how adolescents collectively ponder on the issues of transgenerational responsibility. For example, what arguments would they spontaneously find more intelligible or unintelligible, more justified or unjustified, and how would they negotiate between the potentially dissenting voices within the group? The important thing for the researcher here is not the frequency of particular interpretations but rather how readily interpretations are given, how articulated they are, and how diversely they are negotiated during the discussion (for more details about the methodology, see Löfström, 2014.)

The focus group interviews focused on four large themes which were: Can injustices of the past be repaired trans-generationally? Who can make historical reparations, and to whom? What could be the best way of repairing an historical injustice? Why have apologies for historical injustices become so frequent? Within the main themes other related issues were also addressed, like for example the possibility of official acts of forgiving. Some of the questions were posed at a general level and some at the level of concrete historical cases, like for example violence in the Finnish Civil War 1918 or the deportation of Jewish exiles from Finland during WW II. The interview frame included following items; note that the questions were not always posed in the same order or in the same format.

> – *When speaking of the Finnish Winter War 1939–1940, or the Civil War 1918, how much do you speak of 'us' or think in terms of what 'we' did? How do you find the idea of being part of a chain that binds together many generations?*

> – *What episodes of Finnish history do you perhaps feel proud or ashamed of, and why?*

> – *Who were the guilty ones in 1918 and of what?*

> – *What were the morally bad things that happened in 1918 and how might they be repaired now, if at all?*

– What do you think of the Finnish state apologizig to the former Red orphans?

– What do you think of the idea that developing countries should get reparation from the Western countries for the time of colonialism?

– What do you think of the apology of the then Finnish Prime Minister Paavo Lipponen, in 2000, at the monument for eight Jewish exiles who were handed over to Germans in 1942, and what other ways could there have be for dealing with the 1942 deportation?

– What do you think of the Prime Minister apologizing on behalf of all the (Finnish) people, and how much do you think his words obligate you morally?

– How should one define the group "all the Finnish people" that the Prime Minister referred to?

– Why do you think apologies for past injustices have become more numerous?

– How do you find the idea of repairing historical injustices with money rather than apologies, and in what circumstances might one or the other alternative be more compelling?

– What do you think of historical wrongs being forgiven officially?

– What do you think of the claim that there is moral progress in the history or that historical research can adjudicate who did right and wrong in the past?

In the transcribed interviews passages were coded and categorized with the key words like historical continuity/discontinuity, individual/collective responsibility, and ethical relativism/universalism, so as to identify what issue(s) the students were discussing at that point and what arguments they were making. A more detailed grid was then used for sorting out the diversity of motivations and justifications for or against particular notions and interpretations.

An example of the material is the following excerpt from the transcription of one of the groups. Four students (F22, F23, F24, M26) and the interviewer Q are discussing the possibility of transgenerational reparations:

F23: *I think what happened then [in Finland 1918] has happened, one can't repair it because the people are different now.*

F22: *Yes, one can't repair it anymore.*

F23: *Yes.*

F22: *It won't make things better to anyone anymore.*

F23: *For example, I couldn't apologize to someone for what my grandfather has done because it is not my concern. It is really difficult to apologize when those people are no longer alive.*

F22: *Yes, and those who made the decisions then have been dead for a long time now, in that sense it really is impossible to repair it to anyone anymore.*

[Q: Could the Government today apologize to those who became orphans when their Red parents were killed in 1918, for example?]

F22: *It doesn't sound sensible because surely there were orphans also on the White side. I don't somehow...*

F24: *It is such a remote thing anyway. If you think of those orphans, surely some of them are also already dead.*

F22: *True.*

F23: *Sure it is sad there are these orphans, and they would like to think that someone is accountable for their being orphans, but I can't see how they can expect someone will come and apologize now.*

M26: *I think the state is now the same as in 1918 also when those in power, of course, have changed dozens of times. And when you think there were obvious war crimes [in 1918] afterwards, like executions of thousands of prisoners, and especially you know your relatives carried out executions, you would like someone to apologize. You feel a little ashamed of what the relatives did on the White side.*

F24: *Yes, perhaps it would also clear the air if it was openly talked about. Maybe not blame anyone because who is there to blame anymore, but one would openly speak of it. It could perhaps make it easier for the nation to get over it and [it] would not be a taboo anymore.*

F22: *True.*

F24: *It might be good that at least somebody would say something about it.*

The students in all the focus groups would readily generate arguments in support of the view that since the perpetrators and victims of past unjust acts are no more alive, transgenerational responsibility to reparation does not exist. The idea of there being a rupture between the past and the present seemed intelligible and compelling to them. However in the excerpt above M26 challenged this view and told about his feeling of 'vicarious shame' and this led to the fellow students F22 and F24 acknowledging that feelings of transgenerational shame and guilt may exist and that symbolic reparations like apologies may be genuinely important to those concerned.

The students in the groups would spontaneously subscribe to an individualist notion of moral responsibility: you are only accountable for what you personally do, thus it does not make sense to speak of a moral obligation to amend for the deeds of earlier generations. This view, however, would be modified and the plausibility of historical responsibility would be judged more favourably if the students came to discuss some cases where the transgenerational legacy of the past was more directly visible, like in the material consequences of colonialism. The proliferation of institutional apologies for historical injustices was mostly explained by the students so that apologies serve strategic interests of the apologizing states by bringing to them good-will and political and other advantages. Victims' needs and victims' role in demanding for reparations mostly did not come up in the groups. The students would readily say that historical apologies can remind us all of the tragedies of the past and they can serve as signals of good-will on the part of those who apologize, yet the benefits of apologies to the victims were apparently difficult for the students to imagine.

The students' responses can be seen as manifestations of what Jörn Rüsen (2005) has called exemplary and critical types of historical consciousness: the students agreed among themselves that history can give moral recommendations but they also questioned historical continuity and transgenerational identification. As we noted, in Rüsen's theory there is an implicit hierarchy of types of historical consciousness. The Finnish project, however, was not geared towards differentiating between the various 'levels' of historical consciousness but identifying what difficulties the students have when considering potential interconnections and interdependencies between the past, the present and the future.

The key concepts in the research project were drawn from the theory of history and history education. What can this focus group material offer to a social-psychological study of moral judgment and moral motivation? What concepts or perspectives could be fruitful to consider in that context, and what could be interesting to analyse in the 'moral consciousness' of the students, from the point of view of social psychology?

Useful social-psychological concepts for studying adolescents' moral consciousness: group identification and intergroup relations

As mentioned above, moral consciousness, or moral sensitivity, refers to an awareness of how our actions affect other people immediately and in long-term (Rest, 1986). It includes being aware of who are the concerned parties in the situation, what lines of action are possible, and what may be the consequences of different behaviours to different parties. Who the protagonist perceives as being 'others' in a specific situation also depends on who is included in her/his moral universe. Inclusiveness of the moral universe refers to the breadth of the community to which people apply moral values and rules of fairness (Schwartz, 2007). Moral sensitivity requires both cognition and affect, such as empathy, which is prone to motivate us to behave morally (Hoffman, 2000; Silfver-Kuhalampi, 2009). Empathy is also seen to be the base for guilt. According to Hoffman (2000), guilt is characterized by tension and regret that arise when the person feels empathy for the victim and understands that she/he is responsible for the victim's distress. Empathy may not have been a key concept in cognitive developmental moral theories of justice reasoning, but it has long been studied as a motivator of moral behavior (for example, Stotland 1969; Hoffman 1981).

In recent years the concept of collective guilt has become an increasingly popular research topic in social psychology. Collective guilt is an emotion that arises mainly when group members perceive that they have some responsibility for, or control over, their in-group's wrongdoings or the possible consequences of those wrongdoings (see, for example, Lickel et al., 2005). Feeling collective guilt is thus related to group membership and to the constellation between in-group *versus* outgroup. In the case of historical injustices that were encountered in Finland in the Civil War 1918 or in WW II, for instance, group identity in particular may be activated. There are two cognitive processes going on in transforming group membership into group identity. Categorization takes place when individuals classify people on the basis of their membership in various groupings. The most critical classifications are in-group (the group one belongs to) and outgroup (the group one does not belong to). Identification occurs when individuals take on the qualities and characteristics of the group to which they belong (see, for example, Turner et al., 1987). Typically, strong in-group identification is related to a low tolerance towards outgroup.

A concept related to collective guilt and group identification is intergroup forgiveness or reconciliation. Forgiveness is typically defined as a response that forgoes negative emotions, thoughts and actions (like revenge) in the face of a transgression. Three common conceptualizations of forgiveness are presented on the basis of philosophical and psychological literature: (1) forgiveness supposes the replacement of negative emotions toward the offender by positive emotions; (2) forgiveness is a strictly dyadic process, involving only an offended and an offender who is known to the offender; and (3) forgiveness is not a process that devalues the forgiven person but a process that encourages him/her to behave better in the future (Mullet, Girard, & Bakhshi, 2004).

Mullet, Girard and Bakhshi (2004) investigated in their study of French families how people conceptualize forgiveness and do they share the same theoretical conceptions. The researchers also examined to what extent people differ in these respects. They called the first

conceptualization of forgiveness (replacement of negative emotions by positive ones) a "change of heart" process. Their study showed that approximately only one fifth of the respondents agreed on the notion that forgiving someone is a "change of heart" process. About one third were neutral and over 40 per cent of the respondents disagreed with the conceptualization. Concerning the conceptualization "forgiveness is a strictly dyadic process" the results indicated that most respondents conceptualized forgiveness as something more than a dyadic process. They gave high scores to items like "You can forgive the person responsible for an institution – the state, the church, an association – which have done you wrong", and "You can forgive a person who has done you wrong even after the death of that person". Only 25 per cent of the respondents thought that forgiving is only possible between a known offender and a known offended. Mullet et al (2004) concluded that based on this result, forgiveness is conceptualized as a process that involves a forgiver but not necessarily an offender, and that identities of the possible forgiver and the possible forgiven person are much broader than usually considered in the literature. The third conceptualization (forgiveness helps offenders to behave better in the future) was moderately supported by the respondents: 33 per cent of them agreed with the notion.

Thus, based on (social) psychological research there seems to be divergent ideas of forgiveness among people and in some cases big individual differences. These might explain the different attitudes towards forgiving historical injustices, together with the group identification and moral emotions.

Questions to a social psychologist from a history educator

In the preceding chapter there are some concepts and perspectives the researchers in history education can find inspiring to relate to. For example, sensitivity and empathy are relevant concepts also in history teaching where ability to put oneself in an other person's shoes in order to better understand his/her intentions as an historical actor is considered important. It is called 'historical empathy', and it has a cognitive and an affective dimension. (Endacott & Brooks, 2013.) One of the aims in history teaching is to develop students' historical empathy, thus there is a notion of a hierarchy of levels of historical empathy, albeit it may often remain untheorised. In the previous chapter it is argued that moral sensitivity requires ability to take the other's viewpoint and this includes also being aware of "what might be the consequences of different behaviours to different parties". These are in fact aims that also history educators consider central in developing students' historical thinking and historical empathy (see, for example, Portal, 1987; Harris & Foreman-Peck, 2004; Davis, Yeager, & Foster (eds), 2001). The intriguing question is how the social-psychological theories of moral sensitivity could support conceptually more refined interpretations of historical empathy and its development.

The previous chapter notes: "Collective guilt is an emotion that arises mainly when group members perceive that they have some responsibility for, or control over, their in-group's wrongdoings or the possible consequences of those wrongdoings". If some person, contrary to what could be reasonably expected, does not feel collective guilt, it might then be related to how the person perceives his/her in-group or how he/she perceives that the morally bad thing in the past was not caused by volitional acts, for example. Both perceptions were visible in the Finnish focus groups. The perception where the crucial point is the mental demarcation of the in-group is probably usually more interesting to a researcher of historical consciousness. In the framework of the social-psychological studies of moral sensitivity and moral consciousness, does it make a difference which one of these two perceptions weighs more in the person's mind?

Two further questions come to an history educator's mind when reading the previous chapter: Does it make a difference from a social psychological point of view whether the moral emotion in question is (collective) guilt or shame, and whether this emotion is 'vicarious' or due to the feeling of not having done enough to repair some historical injustice? What can be said about the case M26 in the excerpt above in this view?

The previous chapter also discusses the results of a study on how people conceive the notion of forgiveness. How do the results of that (quantitative) study match with the (qualitative) observations on Finnish upper secondary school students' reasoning on historical responsibility? For example, let us consider the following points.

1) "Forgiveness supposes the replacement of negative emotions toward the offender by positive emotions." In the study only one fifth of the respondents agreed with the notion that the process of forgiving entails some kind of "change of heart". Also the students in the focus groups were sceptical about there being any deeper sentiments involved in forgiveness. In their reasoning the act of forgiving (and apologizing for) historical wrongs may rather have social benefits because the meaning of the act of forgiving is that it is a constructive perlocutionary speech act more than an outcome of some moral conviction. Does this suggest a lacking moral sensitivity or historical empathy, and can this be 'assessed' with some reference point?

2) Only 25 per cent of the respondents in the research on French families thought that forgiving can only be possible between a known offender and a known offended. The students in the focus groups were sceptical about the meaning of symbolic reparation between persons who are not part of the 'original' victim–perpetrator dyad. What bothered them was the idea that perpetrators' or victims' descendants would speak on behalf of their forefathers. Is it an indication of well developed role-taking capability that one can also think of other actors than original victims and perpetrators as moral stake-holders in an historical reparation processes?

3) In the study of French families (only) one third of the respondents considered that forgiveness may encourage people to behave morally better in the future. Do social-psychological studies of moral sensitivity and moral motivation suggest that such an effect exists? There is a long tradition where history, understood as knowledge about the past, is assumed to provide people with moral guidance (*historia magistra vitae*), however in Jörn Rüsen's typology of historical narratives exemplary narratives are, implicitly, not typical of the most sophisticated mode of historical consciousness. If one is predisposed to think that forgiveness can move people towards morally better conduct, does it then also witness of ability to reconsider and reinterpret the past in the light of present and future expectations?

A social-psychological response to a history educator

Above, Löfström is intrigued to know if, and how, the social-psychological theories of moral sensitivity could support conceptually more elaborated interpretations of historical empathy and its various 'levels'. Conceptually, moral sensitivity requires role-taking and empathy which form its cognitive and affective aspects (Rest, 1986). Feelings of empathy are presumed to alert an individual to the moral relevance of the situation (Pizarro, 2000). According to Eisenberg (2000), pure empathy – that is, an affective response to an other's emotional state or condition that is similar to what the other person is feeling or is expected to feel (see, for example, Eisenberg et al., 1994) – is not other-oriented, but by cognitive processing it can turn into sympathy, personal distress or a combination of the two. Thus, empathy, sympathy and personal distress are regarded as divergent emotional experiences although all three require some level of cognitive processing. Hoffman (2000) has proposed that empathy develops through five levels from the newborn reactive cry to empathic distress

beyond the situation. In the latter, a person recognizes that others have feelings beyond the immediate situation and this mental representation of the other's plight leads him/her to feel empathic distress for others. Extensive body of research has supported the developmental path of empathy at the early years of life, although also stable individual differences in children's concern for others over time have been found (Hastings, Zahn-Waxler, & McShane, 2006). To feel mature empathy – or sympathy in Eisenberg's terms – requires then a certain level of cognitive development. Cognitive role-taking (putting oneself in the other's place and imagining how she or he feels), however, is distinct from empathy-related reactions because it lacks emotionality (see, for example, Eisenberg & Morris, 2001), yet it can enable individuals to bypass empathic arousal and bias (Hoffman, 2000; Pizarro, 2000).

In terms of collective guilt, Löfström asks if feeling collective guilt is more related to in-group-outgroup categorization or the transgression being volitional or not, and does it make a difference in the context of a social-psychological study? Both factors play a role in moral sensitivity. Recent research shows that we are prone to a greater moral sensitivity for in-group than outgroup victims, in particular if the perpetrator is from an out-group. (Molenberghs et al., 2014). In-group members' wrongdoings are perhaps not so easy to perceive as immoral. Forgiveness seems also to be negatively related to an in-group identity but positively to a common in-group identity – by finding some superordinate category, which includes both the conflicting groups (Noor et al., 2008). In addition, intensity of the moral issue affects how sensitive people are to transgressions, i.e. how salient and vivid the action is (Sparks, 2015). It might be that human beings perceive in-group's behavior as less immoral because they do not think their transgressions are so salient.

Löfström continues to question if it makes a difference from the social psychological point of view whether the moral emotion in question is (collective, transgenerational) guilt or shame and whether this emotion is 'vicarious' or due to feelings of not having done enough to repair the historical injustice? What can we say about case M26 in the focus group? Guilt and shame are both labelled as self-conscious emotions, that is, they involve self-evaluation of the self. Guilt arises from feeling responsible of unwanted consequences. It focuses on specific behaviors, something that the person her/himself has done or – as in collective guilt – members of his/her in-group have done, or on the possible consequences of the transgression. In shame the focus is on others' reactions: the ashamed person is concerned with others' evaluation of his/her self rather than the acts' effect on others, as in guilt. Guilt typically motivates desire to confess, apologize or repair whereas shame gives rise to desire to hide, escape or strike back, i.e. behave aggressively. (Tangney & Dearing, 2002; Silfver-Kuhalampi et al., 2013.) Yet shame and guilt can co-occur so it is possible at the same time to feel ashamed and guilty. In a study of university students' guilt and shame narratives, Silfver-Kuhalampi (2007) found that reparative behavior was as likely in the situations where both guilt and shame were reported as in the "guilt alone" situations. Pure shame, on the other hand, was less likely to motivate reparative behavior. Thus it could be argued that in the focus group above M26 felt both shame and guilt, and his talking about apology refers to a desire to repair the wrongdoings somehow.

Concerning forgiveness, it seems that the students in the focus groups were doubtful of the "change of heart" forgiveness and they rather spoke of the social benefits of forgiving (and apologizing for) historical wrongs. Does this show a lack of moral sensitivity or historical empathy, and can this be assessed somehow? If we think of Rest's (1986) definition, moral sensitivity involves constructing different possible scenarios for the situation and imagining how different actions might influence the participants in the situation. Moral judgment then could be based on the pros and cons of different actions. Whether focusing on the "change of heart" forgiveness or rather on constructive consequences of forgiveness may then only indicate that the person is emphasizing different aspects of the situation. However, act of

forgiving could be an adaptive coping strategy to manage the painful emotions (Folkman & Lazarus, 1980) and to reduce hostility (Silton, Flannelly, & Lutjen, 2013).

Further it was asked if is it a sign of developed role-taking capability that one can go beyond the dyad victim–perpetrator and apologize or forgive for other 'moral share-holders', not only those immediately present in the dyad? As mentioned above, both mature empathy and mature guilt requires cognitive development, the ability to form mental representations. We can take the perspective of the other and feel sympathy for others even beyond the immediate situation and for fictional characters; research shows that reading narrative fiction can enhance sympathy among adolescents (Sklar, 2013). Hence, due to mature guilt and empathy we are able to apologize or forgive on behalf of actors not being among us anymore.

Lastly it was asked if the social-psychological studies of moral sensitivity and moral motivation show that forgiveness encourages people to behave better in the future. In general, factors of moral motivation, like sympathy and guilt, have shown positive relationship to prosocial behavior (see, for example, Davis et al., 1999), and they can be enhanced (e.g Sklar 2013). Research has also shown that for example in the context of Northern Irish conflict forgiveness predicts reconciliation intentions (Noor et al., 2008). Hence, we can assume that forgiveness has positive influence on future behavior.

Concluding remarks: what elements to add in future focus groups?

Considering the perspectives opened here by Liisa Myyry it is worthwhile to ponder what elements would be important to add in the discussion topics in the focus groups where people are asked to ponder on issues of historical responsibility and reparation? Firstly, Myyry draws attention to the importance of the in-group–outgroup distinction in how people make moral judgments on acts and their outcomes partly depending on how they see the involved actors as part of one's in-group or outgroup. In the Finnish focus groups in 2008–2009 the students were posed questions that were intended to spark discussion that would shed light on this theme. For example, they were asked how they find the idea of being part in a chain of generations that binds 'the Finnish people' in the present and in the past together? The students were also asked to how much they feel that the Finnish Prime Minister's public apology in the name of "all Finnish people" for the deportation of exiles during WW II obliged them personally. In the future it could be worthwhile to pose more questions – and more provocative questions – that would make interviewees reflect if they see the boundaries between their in-group and outgroups as stable or changeable in morally particularly sensitive historical cases.

Secondly, regarding relations between feelings of shame and guilt, Myyry refers to a study of university students' guilt and shame narratives and how the two modes of narratives are likely to coincide or not with reparative behaviours. In the focus groups feelings of guilt and shame were addressed directly in the question to which episodes in Finnish history the students felt proud or ashamed. They were also asked how they find the idea that the developing countries should get reparation for the colonial period from the colonizing Western countries. This is a question related to the in-group/out-group dilemma too, but it was more geared towards generating discussion that might show whether there were feelings of transgenerational guilt or shame among the students. Also here it could be useful in future focus groups to pose more direct questions to the specific issues for students, or possibly, of which, they could be collectively ashamed of or feel guilty of, and, in case such feelings appear familiar and conceivable to them, "what do they think might be the driving forces or the 'causes' behind them?".

Lastly, Liisa Myyry discussed the variety of ideas on forgiveness and how the variety may explain differential attitudes toward the notion of forgiving past injustices. In the focus groups the topic of historical forgiveness was addressed when asking what the students think of historical injustices being officially forgiven and whether someone might have 'absolved' the Finnish people after the Finnish Prime Minister's apology. In future focus groups it could be valuable to discuss more how the interviewees see that forgiveness may entail changes at an emotional level on the part of the forgiver and what effects forgiveness may have in encouraging the forgiven part to morally better conduct in the future, for example.

Understandably the variety of relevant topics for one focus group discussion is too wide if the discussion is to be kept within reasonable limits. The crucial question is which theoretical and conceptual foci to choose that could fruitfully connect issues that are relevant for the study of historical as well as moral consciousness. This also intertwines closely with the question of what could be the most promising tools that enable a crossdisciplinary or interdisciplinary analysis of empirical material like the focus groups above. At this point we are in the beginning of our way in looking for answers.

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Historical consciousness and the moral dimension

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ABSTRACT: Historical orientation is not only about discerning what happened in the past and what can reasonably be expected for and done in the future, but also about sharpening both our perception of the rules and logics and our standards for judging them. Historical thinking as the operation shaping such orientation, therefore, has to integrate reflections in the ethical and the temporal dimension and on their interrelation. On the basis of a classroom discussion and empirical data of students rating different statements relating students' personal identities with their assessments of the Frankish Crusaders raiding Jerusalem in 1099, and using the "FUER-model" of historical competencies, a distinction of two students' reflection as marking two different niveaus of historical competence is suggested.

KEYWORDS: historical consciousness, moral consciousness, historical thinking.

I.

Historical Consciousness has been a subject of theoretical reflection and empirical research for roughly half a century now (Körber, 2015; Seixas, 2012; Seixas, 2015). Having (at least in the German context) contributed considerably to shifting the focus of history education from approaches focusing either on transfer of content-knowledge or targeting mainly educational and/or political aims (such as fostering allegiance with a monarch, a sense of belonging and coherence etc.) towards both a focus on the students' own identities and their orientation as well as on disciplinary concepts (Körber, 2015), the concept never has been theoretically worked out in a single, widely accepted way but rather has spirited a wealth of theoretical developments and empirical research (cf. Rüsen, 2006; Rüsen, 2007; Thorp, 2013; Thorp, 2014).

The temporal dimension being at the core of the concept, its relation to other dimensions of relating to the past and inter-relating past occurrences and structures to the present and future has been also subject of different reflections and efforts of modelling. In several cognition models for history education, the moral dimension has been included into the general concept of historical consciousness namely. historical thinking, without clarifying the relation between temporal and moral thinking. In Germany, Hans-Jürgen Pandel, has suggested to distinguish seven dimensions within historical consciousness, of which three (among them "temporal consciousness" and "consciousness of historicity", meaning "change") form a proprietary core of the domain of history, whereas the other four are shared with other disciplines – among them "moral consciousness" (Pandel, 1987; Pandel, 1987/2005). The distinction has been widely used in German research and teaching, even though both the definition of the dimensions as well as the interrelation of the different dimensions is far from satisfactory (Körber, 2015, p. 7). In the Anglo-Saxon tradition, mainly based on disciplinary concepts, Peter Seixas and Tim Morton have included the "Ethical Dimension" in his "Big Six"

historical thinking concepts, claiming that it is important and even indispensable for reflecting on the implications of history for "us, today" (Seixas & Morton, 2013, p. 6).

Both models are not fully satisfactory so far: With a focus to the moral dimension and drawing on Kohlberg's model of moral development, Pandel. suggests that children only in rather late phases can combine or interrelate moral consciousness with insight into historicity (Pandel, 1987/2005, p. 13), whereas for the early stages, he postulates that children "judge on historical situations analogous to hypothesized present situations without applying a notion of historicity", but also the existence of a "infantine historicism" which declares everything legit because of it being usual back then (Pandel, 1987/2005, p. 13). The former claim fully qualifies the problem of "presentism", identified by Seixas and Morton on one of their "guideposts" referring to the ethical dimension in historical thinking, whereas the second would imply exactly the opposite, drawing on a fundamental alterity of the past, applying a modus of "understanding" the past actions. Neither the merely disciplinary nor the developmental approach therefore can satisfactorily address the interrelation or rather combination between temporal and moral thinking.

In the following, I therefore propose a conceptual framework which might help in this respect. It draws upon a concept developed within a competence-model of historical thinking developed by the German "FUER-group" (Schreiber et al., 2007; cf. Körber, 2015, p. 21). For this elaboration, the focus is not so much on the dimensions of the model, but on the concept of differentiation of levels of competences inherent in the model (Körber, 2015, p. 40).

II.

As a starting point, highlighting the dimensions of the problem, I'd like to refer to a teaching experience I made as student teacher in 1999 at a Hamburg Gymnasium (Körber, 2000). In the advanced course I taught then, students tended to either condemn the behaviour of participants in the past for not corresponding to today's norms, respectively "explain" it with a reference to "personal interests" or apologise it with a reference to either usual standards back then or to general patterns, for example "that's what happens in wars" when referring to My Lai. What's more, some students showed several of these stances next to each other, whereas others had rather consistent opinions, but none of them seemed to be able to reflect on their historiographical nature and importance for the present.

In a teaching exercise I conducted in this class, I challenged students with a task which – on the basis of active application of a specific kind of historical thinking to a highly pertinent historical account – laid open the diversity of their modes of thinking and provided them with information of many other students' reactions to the same task. Both the task and the data were taken from one project out of a series of empirical surveys on historical thinking carried out in Germany by Bodo von Borries (Borries, 1992; Borries, 1995; later Angvik & Borries, 1997), in each of which the probands were confronted with dilemma situations of historical thinking.

In the concrete exercise, after reading a text combining background information with an excerpt from the speech of Pope Urban II -1096, an account of the journey of the Franks to the East and an extract of William of Tyre's account of the raid of Jerusalem, narrating the killing of the Muslims, including women and children and the pious rejoicing of the Frankish raiders after the deed, the students were asked, as had been the probands before, to assess, in 5-point-Likert-scales, eight statements on decisions they would have had to take on participating in the Crusaders' raid of Jerusalem in 1099. The statements differed not only in the result of the decision - "Let's roll!" vs. "Swords away!", but also in the logic of argumentation, some of each referring to contemporary modes of thinking, some of them to

modern ethical standards. [1] When their assessments were anonymously published for comparison, a debate was immediately raging, on the ground that the distribution showed no "consistent" picture – neither in the sense that bellicist vs. pacifist positions were visible nor in contemporary vs. modernist stances (see Graph).

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
1 "Put yourself into the position of a Crusader in the raid of Jerusalem after a long, exhausting journey. What would you have thought, how would you have decided?" 1. "The Pope (...) has allowed it [...]. Let's roll" 2. "Do not justify murder ... So sword away!" 3. "Christ: 'Love your enemies. 'So sword away! " 4. "[...] frenzy of the fight [...] Let's roll!" 5. "Churches and Temples [...] as safe refuge, sword away!" 6. "Seljuk [...] even worse, so let's roll!" 7. "Muslims [...] also God's creatures, [...] sword away!" 8. "God's punishment for the unbelievers. Let's roll!"

Graph

As can be seen, statements contradicting each other were met with approval or respectively disapproval (e.g. #1 and 2), some are commonly approved in which universal moral is either rejected (#3) or negated in favour of a "bellicist" decision (#1; #8), even though they follow different logics. Furthermore, while on some items the students strongly disagreed (e.g. #4 and 7).

This indicates that the question at hand here is not just one of morality, but of narrative competence, that is of convincingly linking the statements' appeal to one's own person and convictions. Some students might refer to a logic that in those times even they themselves would have acted by other standards than they would today, or they could state that in a similar situation it would be quite natural to act like that even under today's condition.

This distribution of the 12th graders' assessments reveals that Pandel's ascription of such combination of applications of both alterity and presentism to young infancy on the basis of Kohlberg's developmental model may be too simple. In some instances, the students seem apply generalized moral standards based on human rights' ideas, such as in the answers to statement #2 (partly also #7). This observation can be explained referring to Kohlberg's theory also: Students in early adulthood may have transgressed the level of mere conventional morality and learned to apply universal standards not only against contrary behaviour in their society, but also to actions in the past (cf. Kegan, 1982). To apply the understanding operation, therefore would require to at least temporarily abandon the universalist moral standard just acquired.

When the distribution was displayed in class, the obviously quite non-uniform evaluation of the statements within the class provoked an intense discussion. It started with a clarification

of different way the students had understood the task which had been intentionally ambiguous in this respect: "were we to answer what we ourselves would have done or what we think a Crusader would have?". The exchange soon led to a differentiation that to try to answer "as a Crusader", to understand his actions would require to concede different moral standards in those distant times and to acknowledge that if oneself had lived back then, one might have acted in similar ways. That this insight was in fact gained in a cognitive way, became visible when results of a large survey were taken into account, which had been carried out in a representative sample of 2063 students of the same age some years before (Fehler: Referenz nicht gefunden).

Result of Survey (N=2063; Grade 12; 1992; Germany) "Put yourself into the position of a Crusader in the raid of Jerusalem after a long, exhausting journey. What would you have thought, how would you have decided?"		Yes, fully correct	Rather correct	partially correct	rather in-correct	no, totally incorrect	no answer
1.	"The Pope (...) has allowed it [...]. Let's roll!"	195 9,1%	248 11,6%	249 16,3%	468 21,9%	803 37,69%	73 3,4%
2.	"Do not justify murder ... So sword away!"	1178 55,1%	443 20,7%	207 9,7%	145 6,8%	99 4,6%	64 3,0%
3.	"Christ: 'Love your enemies.' So sword away!"	634 29,7%	474 22,2%	408 19,1%	327 15,3%	214 10,0%	79 3,7%
4.	"[...] frenzy of the fight [...] Let's roll!"	130 6,1%	286 13,4%	393 18,4%	556 26,0%	690 32,3%	81 3,8%
5.	"Churches and Temples [...] as safe refuge, sword away""	697 32,6%	541 25,3%	403 18,9%	258 12,1%	158 7,4%	79 3,7%
6.	"Seljuk [...] even worse, so let's roll!"	158 7,4%	205 9,6%	485 22,7%	590 27,6%	613 28,7%	85 4,0%
7.	"Muslims [...] also God's creatures, [...] sword away!"	648 30,3%	506 23,7%	443 20,7%	265 12,4%	198 9,3%	79 3,3%
8.	"God's punishment for the unbelievers. Let's roll!"	141 6,6%	140 6,6%	239 11,2%	473 22,1%	1068 50,0%	75 3,5%

Graph 2: Data from (Borries, 1995, 135ff; 463ff); transl. AK 2016

Their results are quite different, revealing a quite definite rejection of all "bellicist" conclusions in favour of all "pacifist" ones, but therefore at the same time a rather "counter-historicist" stance. These results were met with some incredulity by the Hamburg class. As one student put it in her written reflection on the learning process. She writes that the responses of the other 12th graders:

> somewhat surprised me, because my own had in almost all cases been the exact opposite. My own, personal opinion is in line with that the other 12th graders, but not the one I have if I try to see things from a Crusader's perspective, because he would in almost all cases opted for violence, I suppose, whereas I would opt against it [...] On the other hand, I think I would have given different answers [even] in place of the Crusader had I not had additional information. The text in the questionnaire describes their ways of thinking and their motivations quite clearly, but it takes stronger efforts of familiarization (at least for me). I don't share the views of the Crusaders, but I can comprehend them. (Körber, 2000, D2)

Obviously, she has learned to differentiate between her own, present position and values and that of a Crusader, which she might not really fully comprehend, but tries to understand. In her further elaboration, she tries to explain this foreign stance in a rational way, hinting to the influence of the Pope's preaching to illiterate people. What is more interesting, though, is the statement that she:

> wondered that our morals today are so different from that of the Crusaders. It surely has to do with our education, but the question is why we have been brought up so that a human life counts so more for us as for them back then, even though they were so much more religious. One could suppose that it might be quite vice versa. (Körber, 2000, D2)

This kind of differentiation, which can be qualified as a positive kind of "double standards", held together by a narrative, has not been met with approval by all students. One of the most active participants in the discussion, states in her reflection that she gained the insight that in contrast to her classmates, she obviously had:

> a different stance towards morality and behaviour. Whatever hardships you have to endure, it never is justified to kill other people. It was the Crusaders' [own] decision. They knew before about the hardships. That it was supposed a call from God could neither convince me to commit a murder. […] I have learned in the lesson that either I am unable to put myself into the shoes of the Crusaders or that my concept of morality is different from that of my fellow humans. […] I pose different questions to why a person kills, why he acts as under another person's spell […]. (Körber, 2000, D3)

Being a reflection after the intense discussion, this statement is specifically interesting. The author of D3 seems to cognitively grasp the claim to change the perspective refuses to perform it, because it obviously would infringe something like her moral integrity. This becomes specifically clear in her assumption that the others' more successful efforts to "understand" were indicators of their different morality. Obviously she herself can neither perform the operation of historical understanding nor can she understand that her classmates can at least partly differentiate between their own judgements as persons of today and a hypothetical judgement from a different context. Even the reference to the effort is requires – an affirmation of Tony McAlevy's claim that understanding and empathy requires quite intense cognitive effort (Körber & McAleavy, 1998). Or – from a disciplinary view: while the author of D2 engages in narrative meaning-making by reflecting on historical change not only of facts and structures, but also on values, the author of D3 seems to have found no narrative way of making sense over ambivalence.

III.

Do we have any concept by which we can describe, categorize (and maybe judge) the students' different cognition? Such a model would have to be able to explain the observations that there seems to be no linear development from either presentist or historicist logics towards higher insight only. It must be able to explain the coexistence of the different approaches postulated by Pandel as well as a development which puts neither logic simply above the other.

In this last part of the article, I would like to suggest that a differentiation of levels of historical competences developed as part of the FUER model of historical consciousness might be apt for these explanations (Körber, 2015, 40f).

Also based on a general concept derived from Kohlberg's theory but stripped of the temporal (developmental) aspect, the concept postulates that historical competences can be held on (at least) three different levels (niveaus):

- the basic niveau is characterized by erratic, spontaneous and inconsistent performance of historical operations as well as by an inconsistent combination of (largely inconsistent and ill-defined) concepts and categories,

- the intermediate niveau is characterised by the ability to apply consistent concepts which have been developed in society and ascertain compatibility with the other members of society,

- the elaborate niveau is characterized by the additional ability to reflect on the character, the interrelation and the limits of concepts etc., including the necessity of improving them.

This logic of different niveaus of mastery of concepts can explain both Pandel's contradictory characterization of how young children conceive temporality, and subsequent developments. A coexistence of both, a) a historicist thinking which claims that in other times morality must naturally have been different and b) a presentist stance of applying our values to past occurrences, which leads to highly situative and even inconsistent, unstable application of either concept and blurred distinction of their respective characteristics and implications, then is a good indicator of a basic niveau: the question is of temporality of both identity and morals is addressed, but without (the possibility of) referring to clarified concepts.

The intermediate niveau would be indicated by a mastery of both concepts but as rather strictly distinguished and mutually exclusive. People holding this intermediate niveau, do grasp the different narrative implications of both (and other) references: To empathically understand the moral standards of others both requires and implies a minimum of abstention from one's own position, whereas to fully persist in one's own temporal moral position implies a certain hubris, denying the former actors the acceptance of equal standards. On this level, questions of temporal interrelations of moral can, however, only be reflected by using both concepts *next to* each other, choosing between them and their implications, at most identifying their only limited applicability. The reflection of the author of D3 seems to indicate to this niveau. The author grasps the difference in logics and implications between a) "understanding" as trying to tentatively apply (temporarily) foreign values to foreign contexts and b) judging the past actions by the standards of her own time, but apparently she can understand these two operations only as mutually exclusive – and the ability to perform either of them as indicative to a trait of personality, not a competence. This would – within this concept – indicate to her on the intermediate niveau of historical thinking.

The author of the other reflection (D2) however, shows her (beginning) ability to reflect on the tension between the efforts to understand and judge on one's own present values. She apparently is on the way to an elaborate niveau, on which the limitations and the interferences between the two concepts can be reflected upon in an integrating way, leading to an insight into the constructive nature of both our knowledge about the past and the concepts and terminology we use for characterizing them, including and insight that the latter are in themselves subject to historical change. In fact, the elaborate niveau then might be indicated by the insight that historical orientation is neither fully achieved with presentist judgements nor historicist understanding, but only by a reflective combination and "balancing" of these two pillars of historical thinking.

A fully elaborate niveau, then would demand the mastery of the related theoretical concepts of temporal alterity, in its utmost consequence as in David Lowenthal's contention that there was an ultimate difference between the present and the past, rendering the latter "weirder than we realize; it was weirder than we can imagine" (Lowenthal, 2000, p. 74) and of "presentism" – the unconcerned application of present concepts to the past – and their relation to the operations of understanding and judging.

IV.

In conclusion, it can be suggested that the temporal and moral dimension of historical thinking are inevitably interlinked in orientation processes, but that these interlinkages vary and their consistency may be interpreted as indicators of different levels of competences of historical thinking. This then also constitutes a subject which history education can explicitly address.

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